The tertiary tilt: education and inequality in the developing world by Gruber, Lloyd & Kosack, Stephen
  
Lloyd Gruber and Stephen Kosack 
The tertiary tilt: education and inequality in 
the developing world 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Gruber, Lloyd and Kosack, Stephen (2014) The tertiary tilt: education and inequality in the 
developing world. World Development, 54 . pp. 253-272. ISSN 0305-750X  
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.08.002  
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2016 The Authors 
CC BY-NC-ND 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54202/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 THE TERTIARY TILT: 
Education and Inequality in the Developing World 
 
 
 
Lloyd Gruber 
Department of International Development 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
L.Gruber@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Stephen Kosack 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 
Stephen_Kosack@harvard.edu 
 
 
 
July 2013 
 
 
Forthcoming in World Development 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Education is widely perceived to be a tonic for the rising inequality that often 
accompanies development. But most developing-country governments tilt their 
education spending toward higher education, which disproportionately benefits elites. 
We find that in countries with high “tertiary tilts,” rising primary enrollment is 
associated a decade later with far higher inequality—not the lower Gini coefficients 
many would expect. Since most developing countries tilt their spending toward higher 
education, our analysis suggests that efforts that concentrate only on expanding mass 
education, such as the UN’s Millennium Campaign, could end up raising inequality in 
much of the developing world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Investments in education are widely perceived to be a tonic for inequality.  Educate the poor and 
many will catch up to the elites; deny them education and they will fall further behind.  This intuitively 
appealing logic has been one of the rationales behind a variety of policy interventions to spread primary 
education across the developing world, including, most prominently, the UN’s Millennial Campaign for 
universal primary education. 
 But precisely because it seems obvious, the presumed link between primary education and 
inequality has been subjected to little serious scrutiny.  Do higher primary enrollment rates really reduce 
economic inequality? 
 Our investigation of this question yields a surprising answer.  Looking across the developing 
world, we find that higher primary enrollment rates are generally associated with somewhat higher, not 
lower, inequality in the future.  We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in primary enrollment—
about 19 percentage points—is associated, a decade later, with a Gini coefficient that, depending on the 
model specification and control variables, is between .02 and .04 points higher than it would otherwise 
have been. 
 We further demonstrate that this higher inequality is related to a common feature of education 
spending in many developing countries.  Most education systems in the developing world exhibit what we 
term a “tertiary tilt”: their educational resources are concentrated on students in higher education, not 
primary education.  In developing countries without a tertiary tilt—those that concentrate their education 
resources on the primary level—our analysis confirms the commonly assumed positive relationship 
between primary enrollment and inequality: higher primary enrollment rates are associated with lower 
future inequality.  But countries that focus on their primary schools are the exceptions.  Most developing 
countries have high tertiary tilts in their spending, and in these countries increased primary enrollment is 
associated with substantially higher future inequality. 
 This association is cause for concern.  While inequality may or may not slow growth directly1, 
large distributional divides almost certainly exacerbate domestic conflict2 as well as raising deeper moral 
                                                     
1 Barro (2008) provides a recent update. 
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and philosophical concerns.3  Our analysis reveals the tertiary tilt to be such a pervasive feature of 
developing country politics that, without a substantial adjustment in the developing world’s current 
education spending priorities, a major boost in primary enrollment of the sort envisaged by proponents 
of the UN’s second Millennium Development Goal (MDG) would likely be accompanied by substantially 
higher inequality in most developing countries. 
 This paper is in five sections.  In the first we analyze the relationship between primary 
enrollment rates and future inequality, and find that they are positively associated in cross-national data.  
Section 2 introduces the “tertiary tilt,” and section 3 estimates a model of inequality in which primary 
enrollment interacts with the government’s tertiary tilt.  Here we find that greater primary enrollment is 
associated with higher future inequality when spending is skewed toward students in higher education (as 
it is in most developing countries), but that it is associated with lower future inequality in countries 
exhibiting a primary tilt.  The fourth section discusses these findings and the fifth section concludes. 
1. PRIMARY ENROLLMENT AND INEQUALITY 
 In line with the 2nd MDG, the past four decades have seen primary enrollment rates skyrocket 
across much of the developing world.  The 2010 United Nations Human Development Report noted: “[n]o 
country has seen declines in literacy or years of schooling since 1970…[S]ince 1960 the proportion of 
people who attended school has risen from 57 percent to 85 percent.” (United Nations 2010, pp. 36-38). 
Primary completion rates have also been rising, as governments have made greater use of conditional 
cash transfer programs and other promising initiatives (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). 
 This massive increase in primary enrollment rates might have been expected to reduce inequality 
in developing countries.4  There is reason to think that higher primary enrollments would reduce the wage 
premia formerly enjoyed by a handful of workers—the educated elite—by allowing broader access to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006), L. Bartels (2008), Gruber (2013). 
3 Nussbaum and Sen (1993), Cohen (2008), Sen (2009).  In theory, redistribution might help offset the 
resulting wage gap.  But few developing countries possess the necessary tax bases to make this a realistic option. 
4 Psacharopoulos et al. (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Ranis, Stewart, and Ramirez (2000), Checchi 
(2006). 
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skills valued in the labor market, lowering inequality as a consequence.  In industrialized countries, there 
is a well-established negative association between educational attainment and earnings inequality.5 
 But have primary enrollments really been associated with lower inequality in developing 
countries?  The presumed connection between primary enrollment and inequality has, until now, received 
surprisingly little empirical scrutiny.  In studies of inequality, the common practice has been to account 
for the role of education by including a measure of secondary, not primary, education.  For example, 
Higgins and Williamson (1999) include the secondary school enrollment ratio in their model of inequality 
“to capture the intuitive notion that broader access to education reduces inequality” (p. 20).  Other 
studies, notably the seminal Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) paper that introduced the empirical model on 
which much of the later literature is based, also focus on secondary education.  But even the relationship 
between secondary education and inequality is not completely clear.  While several papers do find an 
inverse relationship between secondary enrollments and inequality (e.g., Perotti, 1996; Higgins & 
Williamson, 1999; De Gregorio & Lee, 2002), the coefficient on the secondary enrollment rate is often 
only barely significant.  And Li et al. (1998) find a country’s initial level of secondary education to be 
associated with significantly higher future inequality.6 
 We thus know relatively little about the relationship between primary enrollment and inequality.  
To that end, we begin our analysis by estimating a version of the standard Li et al. (1998) model that 
includes the primary enrollment rate as an explanatory variable.  In the Li et al. model, inequality 
(measured by the Gini coefficient) is determined by two factors: the poor’s access to financial markets 
and constraints on the ability of elites to expropriate wealth from others.  We proxy these factors with 
three variables: 
 the ratio of M2 to GDP (M2); 
 the country’s level of democracy (Democracy); and 
 the availability of land, measured as hectares of arable land per capita (Land).7 
                                                     
5 See Katz and Murphy (1992), Becker (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse (2000), and Bowles, Gintes, and 
Groves (2005).  For an alternate perspective on the data, see Martins and Pereira (2004). 
6 Sylwester (2002) also finds that total education spending reduces inequality. 
7 The poor’s access to financial markets is proxied in the Li et al. (1998)’s model with land inequality and 
the ratio between M2 and GDP, and restraints on expropriation are proxied by the population’s level of secondary 
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 In addition, we include two measures of economic development—GDP per capita and growth in 
GDP per capita—to account for the Kuznets hypothesis that development has a U-shaped relationship 
with inequality: 
 per-capita GDP (GDPpc); and 
 growth in per-capita GDP (Growth). 
 Finally, we control for overall education spending as a percentage of GDP (TotEduExp), lagged 
by 10 years, to account for Sylwester’s (2002) finding that countries that spent more on education in the 
past had lower inequality in the future. 
 Our variable of primary interest is the primary gross enrollment ratio, PrimEnroll, which is ratio 
of the total number of primary students to the number of children of primary school age in the 
population.8  Since we would not expect educational attainment levels to affect inequality immediately, we 
lag both TotEduExp	and PrimEnroll.  We use a lag of 10 years, on the rationale that many students begin 
primary school at age 5 or 6 and are likely to begin work at age 15 or 16. 
In our specification, then, Inequality depends upon: education spending lagged 10 years 
(TotEduExpt‐10); the primary enrollment ratio lagged 10 years (PrimEnrollt‐10); a vector of the five control 
variables noted above that previous studies have shown to be important determinants of inequality (z’), 
fixed country effects (η), and an error term ε where each variable is indexed by country (i): 
	 Inequalityi,t	=	β0	+	β1PrimEnrolli,t‐10	+	β2TotEduExpi,t‐10	+	β3z´	+	ηi	+	εi,t	 (1)	
 Because our focus is on the developing world, we exclude all OECD countries from the sample 
except Mexico and South Korea, both of which were still “developing” during much of the period we are 
investigating.  Our data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, with the 
exception of Democracy, which we proxy with the commonly-used Polity IV measure (Marshall & 
                                                                                                                                                                    
schooling in 1960 as well as the Freedom House measure of civil liberties.  The authors find that a model with these 
four variables explains between 62 and 77 percent of the between-country variation in inequality.  For other 
empirical studies of the determinants of inequality, see Higgins and Williamson (1999), Chong and Calderon (2000), 
and Milanovic (2005). 
8 We use the gross enrollment ratio rather than the net because the net enrollment ratio includes only the 
proportion of appropriately aged students who are enrolled rather than all primary students.  In using the net ratio 
we would thus risk missing a substantial number of primary students, particularly in developing countries where the 
quality of schooling is poor and students often take additional years to complete their primary education.  As a 
robustness check, we re-ran our main specifications using net enrollment rates instead of gross enrollment rates.  
This substitution did not alter our main findings (results available from the authors). 
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Jaggers, 2000). Cross-national time series data are notoriously incomplete, and this is particularly true of 
cross-national data on inequality.  The two inequality indicators we use as our dependent variables were 
both constructed with data taken from household income surveys; only some countries undertake such 
surveys, and those that do collect these data rarely do so on a regular basis.  The World Development 
Indicators database provides Gini coefficients and decile income shares for 142 countries since 1980, for 
instance, but 47 of these have only one observation through 2008, and only 46 have more than four 
observations. 
 Any large-N empirical investigation of inequality must therefore proceed with a good deal of 
caution.  To smooth year-to-year variation, inequality data are usually divided into 5- or 10-year intervals.  
But the particular periodization can also bias estimates.  On the assumption that no year- or period-
average perfectly reflects the underlying parameters, we estimate our models using three different ways of 
slicing the data.  The first two take averages of the data over 5-year periods, one beginning in 1967 and 
extending to 2007 and another starting in 1965 and running to 2005.  The third cut is yearly data.  Our 
primary estimation technique is Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), a procedure that allows us to 
control for autocorrelation, a particular concern with inequality because it is highly persistent over time.9 
 Table 1 displays our estimates of equation (1) for our three samples.  The dependent variable we 
are modeling in these specifications is the Gini coefficient, the traditional measure used in inequality 
research, as compiled by the World Bank.  As an extra robustness check, we also run all our estimations 
with inequality operationalized as P90Share, the percentage of a country’s total income or consumption 
accruing to the richest 10-percent of households for a given year, also as reported by the World Bank.  
The estimates we obtain with this second operationalization are nearly identical to those with the Gini 
coefficient.  Further investigation using a third operationalization—inequality measured as the ratio of the 
                                                     
9 Both of our period samples incorporate data from over 71 developing countries, and our yearly sample 
includes data from as many as 79.  Unfortunately, though, missing observations shrink these samples to a maximum 
of 240 observations for our period data and 875 for the yearly data.  We dealt with some of the gaps in our sample’s 
inequality and per-student spending time series by linearly interpolating the missing annual data for each country.  
(As a robustness check, we re-ran all specifications with non-interpolated data; none of the results are substantially 
different.)  Table A6 in the Appendix has summary statistics for the dataset of periods beginning in 1967.  Datasets 
and Stata code are available from the authors. 
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90th to the 10th percentile of each a country’s income distribution—yielded similar results as well (see 
Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix).10 
 We begin, in columns 1-3, with estimates using data averaged into 5-year periods beginning in 
1967.  Column 1 shows estimates from a specification that includes only our vector of control variables 
z’.  Reassuringly, GDP per capita (GDPpc) is associated with higher inequality—consistent with the 
Kuznets hypothesis—as is the availability of arable land relative to the population (Land), while economic 
Growth is associated with lower inequality.  M2, on the other hand, is strongly associated with higher 
inequality.  This result goes against the intuition and findings in Li et al. (1998), though other papers 
question the significance of liquidity to inequality; see, e.g., Higgins and Williamson (1999).  Also 
somewhat surprising is the absence of any consistent, statistically significant relationship between 
Democracy and inequality. 
 Columns 2-3 introduce our two lagged education variables of primary interest: TotEduExpt‐10 and 
PrimEnrollt‐10.  Intuitively, and consistent with Sylwester (2002), we find that more education spending is 
associated with lower future inequality.  But higher primary enrollment is significantly associated with 
higher inequality.  The results are much the same using 5-year periods starting in 1960 (column 4) and 
yearly data (column 5).  The magnitude is relatively small: a one-percentage point increase in the primary 
enrollment ratio is associated with a Gini coefficient that is between .02 and .04 points higher a decade 
later.  That is, if we were to take our regression estimates literally, they imply that it would take between a 
25 and a 50 percentage-point increase in the primary enrollment ratio to raise the Gini coefficient by just 
one point.  Yet while small in magnitude, the positive association between primary enrollment and 
inequality is highly significant in statistical terms. 
 Why should higher enrollments, which seem to be associated with lower inequality in developed 
countries, be associated with higher inequality in developing countries?  In the remainder of this paper we 
offer an answer: this puzzling finding is associated with a particular bias in the way most developing 
countries allocate their educational spending, a bias we term the “tertiary tilt.” 
                                                     
10 In addition to inequality, we would have liked to explore the impact of enrollment rates on income 
polarization, a distinct concept with potentially greater relevance to the politics of education—and to politics more 
generally (e.g., Esteban & Ray, 1994; Keefer & Knack, 2001; McCarty, et al., 2006).  Data limitations prevent us 
from taking this approach in a large-N study, but future work might use detailed case studies to examine whether 
patterns of income polarization fit the big picture patterns we develop here.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
2.  THE TERTIARY TILT 
 Even as primary enrollment rates have risen sharply across much of the developing world, 
education spending has remained highly concentrated on students at the upper levels.  In Table 2 we 
present a regional breakdown of enrollment and spending figures for the 1990s.  The 1990s were a 
decade of widespread agreement on the need for developing countries to focus more of their educational 
resources on primary students.11  The striking feature of the table is how at odds it is with this consensus: 
far from focusing on primary students, poorer regions were notable for tilting their educational 
investments toward the relatively small numbers of students in higher education. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Most regions spend a similar proportion of their education budgets on tertiary education, about 
25 percent on average.  Yet while wealthier regions enroll a large number of students at that level, poorer 
regions enroll hardly any.  In the 1990s most students in South Asia were primary students, but primary 
per-student spending was just 10 percent of GDP per capita.  Yet while gross tertiary enrollment was just 
5 percent, average spending on these students was 10 times the amount spent on primary students.  Sub-
Saharan Africa’s tertiary per-student spending was more than 4 times its average GDP per capita: the 
average education system in sub-Saharan Africa lavished an average of $2,158 (1995 dollars) on the 3 
percent of the tertiary-aged population who were enrolled, not much less than the $2,564 that the average 
system in East Asia spent—even though the average East Asian country was more than six times 
wealthier.  Not that East Asia’s spending was not tilted: per-student spending on tertiary students there 
was more than 10 times the spending on primary students.  Indeed, only one developing region—Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia—did not exhibit a clear tertiary tilt; its spending profile was closer to the 
OECD’s. 
                                                     
11 The specific point of agreement was that investments in primary education were even more important 
for poor countries than they were for wealthier ones (see Psacharopoulos, 1973, 1981, 1994; Altbach, Hopper, 
Psacharopoulos, Bloom, & Rosovsky, 2004).  In recent years, some scholars—notably in the World Bank, for 
decades one of the strongest proponents of a focus on primary education—began emphasizing the potential 
benefits of higher education (World Bank, 2002).  Nancy Birdsall (1996), for example, argues persuasively that all 
countries should invest something in higher education, if only so they could support the research to apply 
technologies discovered elsewhere to their particular context. 
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  We label this spending bias the “tertiary tilt.”  The bias itself is relatively well-documented 
(Psacharopoulos, 1977, 1994; Bardhan, 1996; Addison & Rahman, 2001; Rozada & Menéndez, 2002; 
Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Menéndez, 2003; Stasavage, 2005).  Occasionally it is taken as a natural 
reflection of the greater cost of educating at higher levels (Judson, 1998).12  But the fact that a university 
costs more to operate than a primary school does not mean that the tilt is inevitable: the governments 
that tilt their spending toward universities are still making a choice to devote a large share of their limited 
educational resources to provide higher education to a relative handful of students, money that could be 
used to provide high quality primary education to a vastly larger number of students.13 
 In poor countries, a tertiary tilt is very likely to benefit wealthier citizens.  Wealthy families 
generally have the financial resources to pay for quality primary schooling out of their own pockets, 
whereas the full price of higher education is likely to strain the finances of most elite families.  The 
interests of poor families are just the opposite.  They cannot afford primary education without help: for a 
poor family, all education is costly, and they are unlikely to be able to borrow to meet those costs.  Unless 
the government provides subsidies sufficient to ensure that poor families have access to high quality 
primary education,14 poor families are unlikely to benefit from any government spending on higher 
education, simply because their children are unlikely to be equipped to compete for limited admissions 
                                                     
12 If there are economies of scale to higher education, some poor countries are spending a great deal on a 
few students in higher education because they have to; it is the only way to build the system.  But this interpretation 
does not get us very far.  Across the world, average spending on tertiary education declines with tertiary enrollment, 
but the drop-off is typically at very low levels of enrollment—below about 7 percent (calculations available from the 
authors).  That is, there seem to be economies of scale as a country moves from educating almost no students to 
educating some, but not when it moves from educating some to educating many.  There are also limits to the 
economies of scale in tertiary education—at least insofar as the quality of that education is concerned.  The 
University of California enrolled more than 200,000 students in 2010, but still spent an average of nearly $16,000 on 
each one (University of California, 2010). 
13 While one might hope that public funds would be ample enough to allow governments to commit to all 
three educational levels, in practice educational budgets are limited—especially in developing countries. In practice, 
then, a choice to improve tertiary education is to a large degree a choice to take resources away from other 
educational levels. 
14 Although there is some debate about the connection between resources and school quality, and while 
there are undoubtedly diminishing returns to resources, there is little doubt that scarce resources make quality 
education difficult.  In cross-country regressions of upper-middle and high income countries, higher per-student 
spending explains about half the variance in test scores (OECD, 2003), and there is considerable evidence for a link 
between educational resources and wages (for a discussion, see Card & Krueger, 1996a, 1996b).  Without resources 
it is far harder to hire good teachers and consistently provide textbooks and supplies like paper and chalk, let alone 
construct high-quality school buildings—buildings that, for instance, can be used in the rain (World Bank, 2004; 
UNESCO, 2005).   
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with elite children, whose parents can afford primary education that better prepares students for entrance 
exams.15 
 To be clear, we do not want to discount the important economic, political, and cultural roles that 
public universities play in many developing countries.  Large public universities provide the advanced 
managerial, scientific, and technical training necessary to managing and guiding a modern state and 
economy; they can also contribute to a robust civil society and serve as breeding grounds for future 
leaders and new social movements (Birdsall, 1996; Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007).  But our focus 
here is inequality: inequality between the resources allotted to tertiary relative to primary education, and 
the wedge that tertiary-skewed spending may be driving between a society’s haves and have-nots. 
 It would be difficult to overstate this funding disparity—either its magnitude, or the extent to 
which, as we saw in Table 2, high tertiary tilts pervade the developing world.  The cases of Brazil and 
Ghana illustrate some of these effects , both the tilt’s impact on disparities in the education system and its 
impact on underprivileged students’ access to it.16  In a 1979 report on Brazil, the World Bank noted that 
“while most rural primary schools must do without piped water and basic sanitation facilities, almost all 
public universities in Brazil have swimming pools, sports facilities, pleasant cafeterias, and other social 
amenities” (World Bank 1979, pg. 3).  Only 10 percent of admissions to these universities went to 
students whose fathers were “working class”—unskilled or skilled workers or supervisors of manual 
workers (World Bank, 1979).  In the early 1980s, 60 percent of rural primary teachers working in 
northeast Brazil classrooms had not themselves finished primary school, and only a third of first graders 
in these rural schools made it to second grade (World Bank, 1979; R. W. Harbison & Hanushek, 1992). 
 Ghana presents a similar picture.  During the 1970s, per-student spending on Ghana’s university 
students was between 131 and 171 times per-student spending on primary students (Kosack, 2012).  In 
1988, less than half of Ghanaian schools could use their classrooms in the rain, less than 80 percent had 
                                                     
15 In theory, a perfect credit market could reduce the high costs of a university education, particularly as 
higher education prepares students for well-remunerated employment and so, in most cases, has very high returns in 
the labor market (Mincer, 1974).  In practice, however, it is hard for families to borrow against these future earnings 
to purchase quality education for their children. A university education, while valuable in the sense of allowing a 
student to earn higher wages in the future, cannot easily serve as that collateral—if the student later defaults, a bank 
cannot take her education. Repayment of educational loans thus depends to an unusual degree on the borrower’s 
goodwill, making them risky for banks.  Even in wealthy countries, private banks will rarely offer them without a 
subsidy or government guarantee (Friedman, 1962; Wiseman, 1987; Ljungqvist, 1993). 
16 See also the discussions in Psacharopoulos (1977), King, (1997), and Schultz (2004). 
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blackboards, and two-thirds reported shortages of chalk.  Only 13 percent of English students and 21 
percent of math students had a textbook (World Bank, 2004).  By contrast, all Ghanaian university 
students received a government scholarship that covered not only tuition, but room and board, books, 
clothing, travel, examination fees, activities’ fees, and even provided extra money for the student to use as 
they wished (Ghana, 1971). 
3.  THE TERTIARY TILT AND INEQUALITY 
 How might these spending patterns influence the relationship between enrollment and 
inequality?  To begin our empirical inquiry, we need a measure of the education spending tilt—of how 
much developing country governments value upper level students, particularly those attending university, 
relative to students at the primary level. 
(a) Measuring bias in educational spending 
 Measuring this relative valuation is straightforward: we can capture it directly, as tertiary per-
student spending as a proportion of spending on students in primary education. 
 
where TertSpendPerStudi,t is per-student spending on tertiary education in country i at time t.17  We 
minimize the impact of countries with very high tilts by taking the natural log of this ratio: 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 To facilitate cross-national comparisons, each country’s per-student spending figures are taken as a 
percentage of its GDP per capita, as in Table 2.  Our data are again drawn from World Development Indicators.  Tables 
A6 and A7 in the Appendix shows values of TerTilt for all country-years for which we have reliable data.  Readers 
may note that our measure of TerTilt does not include secondary education.  This is because the nature of secondary 
education is highly variable across developing countries: in many, secondary school resembles higher education—
highly subsidized and restricted—but in others it is more like primary education, in being accessible and poorly 
funded.  While we do not include secondary education in TerTilt, as a robustness check,we re-ran all our TerTilt 
specifications substituting TerSecoTilt, a measure of education spending bias that puts both tertiary and secondary 
per-student spending in the numerator, dividing this sum by per-student spending on primary pupils.  The results 
(available upon request) are closely in line with those generated by the TerTilt specifications reported here. 
TertSpendPerStudi,t
PrimSpendPerStudi,t
TertSpendPerStudi,t
PrimSpendPerStudi,tTerTilti,t	=	ln	
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TerTilt is highly negatively correlated with tertiary enrollment (r = – 0.70 with five-year periods beginning 
in 1967), which supports our earlier contention that highly tilted education systems have upper levels that 
are both highly resourced and highly restrictive. 
 We can investigate the role of the tertiary tilt in mediating the relationship between primary 
enrollment and inequality by interacting the government’s commitment to primary students with the 
population’s access to primary education.  To measure this access, we generate a metric of the relative 
accessibility of a country’s primary schools to students from poor families—that is, to students whose 
parents cannot afford to buy quality primary education on their own and are therefore reliant on state-
funded schools.  The higher the primary enrollment ratio, the higher, generally, is the relative proportion 
of students from poor families (Psacharopoulos, 1977; Addison & Rahman, 2001; Rozada & Menéndez, 
2002). What is a “high” enrollment ratio?  We are agnostic about the threshold.18  Instead of fixing one, 
we standardize the ratio across all countries for which we have primary enrollment data, so that a ratio is 
high or low relative to the world average, and an increase of 1 unit represents an increase of one standard 
deviation in the world’s distribution of primary enrollment ratios.19  A high value for this variable, which 
we call PrimEnrollStd, indicates a primary system that is comparatively open to poor students, and vice 
versa.  Interacting PrimEnrollStd	with a government’s education spending tilt thus allows us to see the 
effect on inequality of increasing enrollment at various levels of government commitment to primary 
students. 
PrimEnrollStdi,t	ൌ	STD	ሺPrimary	Enrollment	Ratioi,tሻ	
                                                     
18 An alternative would be to define an “optimal” enrollment ratio.  One effort to do this is Judson (1998), 
who calculates whether, given current per-student spending levels, enrollments are at their optimal levels.  But 
because Judson’s calculation requires an assumption that spending per-student equals, or at least is close to, the true 
cost of educating each student, hers is not a useful method for our purposes.  The common approach is simply to 
assume that the optimal ratio is 100 percent.  The result of the plethora of rate-of-return studies is that the highest 
economic returns in the poorest countries are to primary education (Psacharopoulos, 1973, 1981, 1994), but the 
implication of this is simply that enrollment should be expanded, not what the target level should be.   
19 Looking across all the countries for which the World Bank provides data, the mean primary enrollment 
ratio was 96 percent, with a standard deviation of 22 percent.  (A country can have a ratio of greater than 100 
percent if its system enrolls students who are older or younger than the typical school ages.  Brazil’s ratio is very 
high because it has a high repetition rate, so that primary school students are often much older than they should be 
(R. W. Harbison & Hanushek, 1992).  In fact, Brazil’s enrollment rate reached 165 percent in 1999, the highest rate 
in our sample.  To put this in perspective, the lowest rate—that of Oman in 1970—was just 3 percent. 
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 The simple hypothesis that orients our analysis can now be stated in terms of the following 
interaction: Where governments have skewed their education spending toward their primary sectors (i.e., 
where TerTilti,,t‐10 is low), high primary enrollments (PrimEnrollStdi,t‐10) will be associated with lower Gini 
coefficients (Inequalityi,t) 10 years later, consistent with the intuition behind international efforts to boost 
primary enrollments in the developing world.  But where governments tilt their education spending 
toward tertiary students (TertTilti	t‐10 is high), we expect high primary enrollments (PrimEnrollStdi	t‐10) to 
be associated with higher Gini coefficients (Inequalityi,t) a decade on.  As we discuss below, both 
propositions find considerable support across a range of datasets and estimation techniques. 
 To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate equation (1), our model of inequality, adding TerTilt	and 
an interaction of TerTilt	and PrimEnrollStd.		As in equation (1), the vector z’ contains five variables that 
may affect Inequality: M2 as a percentage of GDP (M2); the level of democracy (Democracy); per-capita 
GDP (GDPpc); growth in per-capita GDP (Growth); and the availability of land, measured as hectares of 
arable land per capita (Land). 
Inequalityi,t	ൌ	β0	൅	β1PrimEnrollStdi,t‐10	൅	β2TerTilti,t‐10	൅	β3ሺPrimEnrollStd	x	TerTiltሻi,t‐10		
																																				൅	β4TotEduExpi,t‐10	൅	β5z´	൅	ηi	൅	εi,t	 (2)	
 As with equation (1), we estimate equation (2) using three ways of slicing the data: yearly, 5-year 
averages for the period beginning in 1967 and extending to 2007, and 5-year averages for the period 1965 
to 2005.  We further check the robustness of our findings by using two estimation techniques.  As in 
section 1, our primary technique is Feasible GLS with fixed effects, an appropriate procedure given the 
risk of autocorrelation in panel regressions of inequality.  But we also present results using FGLS 
random-effects estimation with robust standard errors.  In using these alternative estimation techniques, 
we are guided by the assumption that any strong pattern in our data, if it truly exists, will show up 
irrespective of the particularities that inhere in each estimation procedure or way of slicing the data.  This 
empirical strategy biases us toward failure, and the fact that, despite this bias, we do find a strong pattern 
in the data should help to convince readers who share our hesitancy about running regressions on 
unbalanced cross-national time series panel datasets that the statistical relationships we find are real. 
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 While random-effects estimation of pooled time series cross-sectional (TSCS) models is nothing 
new, our particular approach differs somewhat from the more familiar models in the empirical literature.  
A major concern when estimating any TSCS model is unobserved heterogeneity in clustered data.20  Each 
of the country-clusters in our dataset may have a different intercept, raising the possibility that our 
model’s between-country variation will be correlated in some fashion with the within-country (year-to-
year or period-to-period) variation in which we are primarily interested.  Our FGLS technique addresses 
this problem by incorporating cluster-specific dummies: country fixed effects.  But including country 
fixed effects absorbs precious degrees of freedom.  Thus for our second set of estimates we use a 
relatively new technique from Bafumi and Gelman (2006) and B. Bartels (2008), which allows us to tease 
out our causal variables’ distinct between- and within-country effects by including each variable’s country-
specific mean as a separate regressor.  These additional variables capture our model’s between-country 
effects more parsimoniously than the dozens of country dummies we include on the right-hand side of 
our FGLS equations.  Having separated out the country means for each variable, we then subtract these 
means from our time-varying regressors, thus obtaining a clean operationalization of each regressor’s 
within-country effects.  After performing these simple transformations, we estimate the full specification 
using a FGLS random-effects model with robust standard errors.  The model takes the form of Equation 
3 below, where the within-country coefficients are denoted by the superscript w and μi and εi,t are 
respectively the between- and within-country components of the error term: 
  
                                                     
20 The analysis of TSCS data has been the source of productive debate within both economics and political 
science (Beck, 2001; Zorn, 2001; Wawro, 2002; Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). 
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 One common concern in cross-national regressions like ours is endogeneity.  As a general matter, 
the relationship between inequality and education spending could run both ways: education spending may 
affect inequality, as we theorize, but that inequality could in turn influence education spending, e.g., if 
those who benefited become commensurately more politically powerful (as in the “political economy” 
pathway discussed in Li et al. 1998).  Endogeneity is far less of a concern with our particular model, 
however, as our dependent variable is future inequality: it is unlikely that inequality today caused education 
spending a decade ago.21  
 As noted earlier, while our dataset has excellent coverage across space and time, we do have a 
large number of missing observations.  Some of our estimates are based on fewer observations than 
others, depending on the particular technique and/or periodization we are using.  The paucity of 
observations in some of our regressions—our smallest sample sizes are those using 5-year averages for 
the period 1965 to 2005—is yet another reason we have chosen to present our results using a variety of 
techniques and samples, to allay any concern that our main findings may be dependent on a handful of 
observations or a particular sample. 
(b) Results  
 Our results are in Tables 3 and 4.  (Re-estimations with our alternative P90Share and P90:P10	
measures of inequality are in Table A5.)  We begin with Table 3, which shows the estimates we obtained 
using FGLS with fixed effects.  Column 6 displays the estimates from a specification that omits our 
variables of interest and contains only the vector of control variables z’.  The significant variables are 
TotEduExp, M2, GDPpc, and Land.  Consistent with the Kuznets hypothesis, higher GDP per capita is 
                                                     
21 While future inequality is unlikely to cause current education spending, this does not entirely eliminate 
concerns about endogeneity; it remains possible that a third factor explains both current education spending and 
future inequality.  The common method for dealing with this concern is the Arellano-Bond GMM method, which 
accounts for endogeneity in the absence of a suitable instrument by using the sample moments of each variable as 
instruments (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  The downside of this method is that it requires a tremendous amount of 
data, and in our case left us with results based on only 18 observations across 14 countries—far too few to provide 
anything other than the most speculative of results. 
Inequalityi,t		=	β0		+		β1PrimEnrollStdi,t‐10		+		β2TerTilti,t‐10			
															+		β3(PrimEnrollStd		TerTilt)i,t‐10		+		β4TotEduExpi,t‐10		+		β5z´	
															+		1PrimEnrollStdi		+		2TerTilti				+		3(PrimEnrollStd		TerTilt)i			
															+		4TotEduExpi		+		5z´		+		i		+		εi,t	 (3) __	
___________	_______________________	 _______________________________________	w																					w	
__________________	w													w	
w	
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associated in developing countries with higher inequality.  The supply of money and the abundance of 
arable land are also associated with higher inequality, while lagged education expenditures are associated 
with lower inequality, as in Sylwester (2002).  In column 7, we introduce our lagged education variables: 
PrimEnrollStd and TerTilt.  The coefficient on PrimEnrollStd is positive and significant, while TerTilt	is 
insignificant. 
 In column 8 we introduce the interaction term we discussed in the previous subsection.  As 
expected, its coefficient is positive and highly significant, and remains so in all six of the regressions in 
which we have included it on the right-hand side (columns 8 – 13). 
 These results strongly suggest that if a country tilts its education spending toward primary 
students (i.e., TerTilt	is relatively low), higher primary enrollment is associated with lower inequality in the 
future, consistent with the intuition behind international efforts to boost primary enrollments in the 
developing world.  But where governments tilt their education spending away from primary students—
where TerTilt	is high—higher primary enrollment is associated with higher future inequality.  Put another 
way, the general pattern we found earlier reappears: the higher is a developing country’s primary 
enrollment today, the higher is its inequality 10 years later.  But countries with low TerTilts—countries 
that concentrate their educational resources on primary students, not upper level students—are 
exceptions: the higher their primary enrollment today, the lower their inequality 10 years later. 
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 The magnitudes here are substantial.  Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of primary enrollment on 
inequality at different levels of TerTilt	t‐10.  In our main dataset—5-year periods starting in 1967—the 
highest tilt toward upper-level students was in Kenya from 1992-1996; the lowest was in South Korea 
from 1997-2001.  If we take literally the coefficients in column 8, they imply that in South Korea, where 
spending was highly tilted toward primary students, an increase in primary enrollment of one standard 
deviation—19.3 percentage points—would be associated a decade later with inequality that was .063 
points lower on a 0 – 1 Gini index.  But in mid-1990s Kenya, where spending was highly tilted toward 
university students and away from primary students, a one-standard-deviation increase in primary 
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enrollment would be associated 10 years later with a Gini .129 points higher than it would otherwise have 
been.22 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 These magnitudes change somewhat depending on the sample and the estimator—the results 
reported in column 10 imply, for instance, that a one-standard-deviation increase in Kenya’s primary 
enrollment rate during the mid-1990s would generate a Gini only .083 points higher, while the results in 
column 9 imply a Gini .163 points higher  But these relatively small differences do not alter the basic 
result: higher primary enrollment lowers inequality when countries tilt their spending toward primary 
students, but substantially raises inequality in countries when the spending tilt is toward upper-level 
students.  Furthermore, in only two of the six regressions—the results using FGLS with random effects 
and 5-year periods (columns 11 and 12)—does the significance of the interaction terms fall below the 
one-percent level.23 
 In sum, higher primary enrollment is associated with lower future inequality only in countries 
that concentrate their education resources on the primary level.  But these countries are the exceptions.  
In countries with high tertiary tilts—that is, in most developing countries—higher primary enrollment is 
associated with far higher future inequality. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
 These empirical associations naturally raise a number of questions.  Are the results plausible—is 
it reasonable to think that higher primary enrollment would be associated with greater inequality where 
the tertiary tilt is high?  And why do so many developing country governments choose to have high 
tertiary tilts?  Our purpose in this paper is to document a surprising empirical reality rather than fully test 
the mechanism behind it.  Nonetheless these questions are worth discussion, both to defend the 
                                                     
22 The threshold level of the tertiary tilt at which enrollment’s association with future inequality becomes 
negative is 1.215.  
23 As many of the countries with high tertiary tilts are in sub-Saharan Africa, readers may wonder whether 
our results are driven disproportionately by African countries.  We conducted two robustness checks to explore this 
possibility.  First, we re-ran our main specification with a sub-Saharan Africa dummy; our results did not change, 
and in fact the dummy was insignificant.  Second, we ran our main specification on a sample restricted to countries 
outside of sub-Saharan Africa.  (We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.)  Our results also held in this 
smaller sample, implying that the association between higher enrollment higher future inequality in high-tertiary-tilt 
countries applies more broadly across the developing world than in sub-Saharan Africa alone. 
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credibility of the findings as well as lay the groundwork for future theoretical and empirical work to 
explain them. 
 First, why do the leaders of so many developing countries systematically tilt educational resources 
toward the upper levels even as they increase primary enrollment?  We suggest that the pervasiveness of 
the tertiary tilt results from the political constraints under which the leaders of developing countries are 
operating.  However sympathetic political leaders may personally be to the idea of quality primary 
education,24 their main priority as political leaders must be to stay in power, and they can only achieve this 
objective by privileging the demands of societal groups that can threaten their power.25  The poor are 
rarely organized and influential enough to be credible bases of support for or threats to governments; 
instead, leaders in developing countries typically rely for their support on relatively small groups of elites, 
whose organizational and resource advantages put them in a far better position to be supportive of a 
government that serves them and threatening to a government that does not (Lipton, 1977; Bates, 1981; 
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).  To politically constrained policymakers, then, a 
widely heralded goal like providing every child with a high-quality primary education may be politically 
difficult.  As argued earlier, elites benefit more when the government concentrates its limited education 
resources on restrictive upper levels of education, whose enrollment is likely to be drawn 
disproportionately from wealthy families—whose political support the leaders need to stay in power.  In 
other words, the simplest reason for the tertiary tilt may be that powerful constituencies in most 
developing countries want it, and so will reward political leaders who provide it.26 
                                                     
24 If their signatures are at all meaningful, it is likely that many political leaders do have a personal 
preference for improving primary education: delegates from 155 countries signed the 1990 World Declaration on 
Education For All. 
25 Downs (1957), Haggard and Kauffman (1995). 
26 In a supplementary analyses available from the authors, we consider, first, whether the tertiary tilt can be 
explained by level of development or level of democracy (influential empirical work in political science has 
associated more democratic governments with higher spending on primary education; seeBrown & Hunter, 1999; 
Stasavage, 2005).  We find that while both are statistically significant predictors of the tertiary tilt, the magnitude of 
their association is surprisingly small: a shift from full autocracy to full democracy, for example, lowers the expected 
tertiary tilt by less than the difference between the most and second-most tilted countries in our data.  Second, we 
consider whether the tertiary tilt is a temporary problem—the result of spending’s taking time to adjust to increased 
enrollment.  We find, however, that while there is some small tendency for governments to spend more on primary 
students as their numbers increase, that tendency is far too small to alleviate the tertiary tilt’s overall effect on 
inequality. 
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 In countries with high tertiary tilts, is it plausible for increases in primary enrollment to be 
associated with higher, not lower, future inequality?  There is good reason to think so.  A rise in the 
enrollment rate may have some positive effect on the incomes of new students.  But it is unlikely to 
reduce the incomes of a society’s top earners since, without a commensurate increase in secondary and 
tertiary enrollment, new primary graduates would have little chance of continuing on to the higher levels 
of education that are a prerequisite for entry into the most lucrative occupations.  And as for those who 
would have graduated from primary school anyway, any increase in the total number of primary students 
would be likely to reduce their future earnings power, both relatively speaking and in absolute terms, for 
at least two reasons.27  The first is the difficulty, where resources are scarce, of expanding education while 
maintaining quality for existing students.  The second reason has to do with the demand for primary-
educated workers in capital-poor developing countries, and in those characterized by high tertiary tilts in 
particular.  These add up to an environment in which it is highly plausible that higher inequality would 
follow an increase in primary enrollment.28 
 First, enrollment growth on its own may reduce the quality of education available to existing 
primary students, particularly in countries with high tertiary tilts.  This is because the children who are the 
likely targets of efforts to increase enrollment—those who are not in primary school or who are dropping 
out before graduating—are likely to be harder to teach, on average, than the students who are currently in 
school.  They are more likely to come to school hungry or unhealthy and may lack home environments 
conducive to acquiring formal education.29  They may be disproportionately girls or minorities, who were 
traditionally excluded from the education system and require additional support to thrive in an unfamiliar 
environment in which they may feel unwelcome.  These are often the very populations at which the 
                                                     
27 At least in the short run.  In the long run, of course, increases in average productivity across the 
economy brought by widespread basic education may offset these short-run loses. 
28 A third possibility is that a broadly educated population disproportionately raises the productivity—and 
thus the earnings—of an economy’s best-educated workers.  The analogy is to the well-known phenomenon in 
industrialized countries of rising CEO pay while the pay of average workers, who are increasingly educated, has 
stagnated.  This mechanism is related to but somewhat distinct from the second mechanism we discuss: the 
increasing abundance of primary-educated workers that puts downward pressure on their wages.  It may also be the 
case that, in addition to allowing those at the top to capture productivity gains that come from better educated 
workers being more widely available, the greater abundance of primary-educated workers independently increases 
the productivity of those at the top of the income scale, further boosting their earnings.   We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
29 Gomes-Neto et al. (1997), Alderman et al. (1997), Case, Fertig, and Paxson (2005), Eide, Showalter, and 
Goldhaber (2010). 
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international community’s emphasis on expanding primary enrollment is specifically being targeted.  Yet 
adding these children to the education system in a country with a high tertiary tilt—where educational 
resources are focused on students in higher education, not primary education—is likely to strain the 
system, forcing it to adjust in ways both obvious (more students sharing desks and textbooks) and subtle 
(teachers spending less time with each student).  Recognition of this very problem is at the root of a 
growing chorus of international advocates now clamoring for an increase in educational quality 
commensurate with the international community’s push for increasing enrollment.30 
 As for the students who would not normally be attending school, one might think that they, at 
least, would benefit from the time they would now be spending in their country’s primary system, 
however reluctant their parents may initially have been to enroll them.  But even this is unclear.  
Schooling is a costly investment, after all, even for students who receive it for free.  In addition to 
schooling’s direct costs—books, uniforms, transportation—students bear substantial opportunity costs: 
in particular, they have less time to spend learning the traditional skills that sustained their ancestors and 
may be just as important to success in the agricultural or informal sectors in which most of them will end 
up earning their livings.31 
 The second reason that enrollment growth is likely to reduce the incomes of existing primary 
students has less to do with the tertiary tilt itself than with the labor market characteristics of developing 
countries.  In poor countries with small formal sectors and limited capital, the supply of primary-educated 
workers can easily outstrip demand, leading to low rates of return on primary education.  Although most 
studies report a positive effect of lower-level schooling on productivity, most concentrate on formal-
sector workers32, and studies that examine agriculture and the informal sectors productivity 
improvements from lower-level education generally attribute these improvements to the adoption of 
                                                     
30 The same UN Human Development Report, cited above, that reports the tremendous worldwide 
progress in expanding primary education also notes that “many developing countries have proven more capable of 
putting children in school than of giving them a high quality education” (United Nations, 2010, p. 36); see also 
Filmer, Hasan, and Pritchett (2006).  A related literature in industrialized countries explores the effects of 
eliminating tracking on the academic performance of students who would normally have been placed in the 
accelerated tracks (e.g., Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006; Brunello & Checchi, 2007; Malamud & Pop-Eleches, 2011). 
31 On the importance of on-the-job training, and learning-by-doing more generally, see Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995) and Johanson and Adams (2004). 
32 Owens and Wood (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (2003). 
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productivity-enhancing technologies by better-educated workers.33  By contrast, studies that rely on 
nationally representative household surveys—not simply workers in the formal sector—generally find 
much lower rates of return to primary education in poor countries: for example, Schultz (2004) surveys 
recent comparable returns to primary education in six countries in Africa, where tertiary tilts tend to be 
high, and finds very low returns of between 2 and 7 percent—partly the result, he concludes, of a vast 
expansion of primary education, coupled with a highly restricted higher education sector, in the context 
of weak economic growth and thus limited or lagging demand for primary-educated workers.34  There are 
even poor countries where primary-educated workers are so abundant that the return on primary 
education has fallen effectively to zero.  One such country is Ghana, ironically one of 10 countries the 
UN cites as success stories in expanding basic education35: in Ghana, a recent study found no statistically 
significant return to the first nine years of schooling (World Bank, 2004).36 Countries with high tertiary 
tilts are not the only ones to experience low returns, of course.  But the tilt, where it exists, almost 
certainly exacerbates the problem, as resource-strapped primary systems have an especially hard time 
teaching productivity-enhancing skills that could make basic education a useful investment in countries 
with limited capital. 
 For all these reasons, we question the presumption that primary enrollment-boosting initiatives 
are a major step along the path to lower inequality.  Instead, our theoretical expectation is that inequality 
will depend on primary education’s economic rewards for both new and existing students.  To clarify the 
underlying logic, Figure 2 presents four hypothetical scenarios for the inequality effects of increasing the 
primary enrollment ratio from 50 to 90 percent in a stylized society with 10 people.  In the status quo, 
                                                     
33 See Welch (1970), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Vashishtha (1995), Birdsall 
(1993), and Jamison and Moock (1984).  On the questionable cross-national connection between educational 
attainment and output per worker, see Pritchett (2001). 
34 Schultz’s recent findings are notable for sharply contrasting with earlier cross-national surveys such as 
Psacharopoulos (1981, 1994), which reported an average worldwide return to primary education of 18 percent.  In 
countries with such low rates of return to primary education it is questionable that primary schooling on its own—
that is, when the student has little possibility of advancing to higher education—is a good investment for poor 
families, even when it is free. 
35 United Nations (2008).  The others are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda.  
36 A 1999 survey of homeless youths in the Ghanaian capital—youngsters found “living, working, and 
sleeping on the streets of Accra”—found that only seven percent had never attended school, while 40 percent had 
graduated from junior secondary school (Amankrah, Wadieh, Amuzu, & Kristensen, 1999).  Unsurprisingly many 
poorer Ghanaian families in the late 1990s harbored deep reservations about the value of primary education (Addae-
Mensah, 2000). 
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enrollment is 50 percent: five people did not attend primary school and went on to earn $2 per day; 
another five did attend primary school, and of these: three entered the workforce after graduation and 
earned $20 per day, and two—members of the society’s elite—went on to secondary school and 
university and ended up earning $60 per day.  The Gini coefficient for this income distribution is .57 on a 
0 – 1 scale. 
 In the first two scenarios, inequality falls following an increase in primary enrollment.  In the first 
scenario, increasing enrollment to 90 percent raises the incomes of new primary graduates from $2 to $3.  
Competition from the increasing number of educated workers lowers the wages of the two university 
graduates, from $60 to $45, as well as of the three current primary graduates who would have graduated 
from primary school without the increase in enrollment; their wages fall from $20 to $10.  In this 
scenario, the increase in enrollment lowers inequality from a Gini of .57 to .56.  In the second scenario, 
increasing the enrollment rate to 90 percent raises the incomes of new primary graduates from $2 per day 
to $3 per day but does not affect the incomes either of university graduates or of current primary 
graduates—those who would have graduated from primary school without the increase in enrollment.  In 
this scenario inequality drops by more than in scenario 1, from .57 to .55. 
 But neither of these two scenarios is realistic.  The new primary graduates are unlikely to be able 
to compete for the jobs held by the university graduates.  They will, however, compete with existing 
primary graduates for jobs and the use of scarce capital.  In addition, adding these new students to the 
education system without investing commensurate new resources is likely to lower the quality of the 
primary education available to current graduates.  Both effects will tend to reduce the wages of existing 
graduates.  We capture this in the third scenario.  Here, the expansion of primary education still raises the 
earnings of the very poorest—those who were previously out of school—by the same amount, from $2 
to $3.  The expansion also does nothing to erode the wage premia enjoyed by elite tertiary graduates.  But 
existing students’ future incomes are reduced from $20 to $10 per day, reflecting the rise in the 
competition they face for formal sector jobs requiring a primary education as well as the reduction in 
primary education’s overall quality as the system takes on new students.  In this scenario, inequality rises, 
from a Gini of .57 to .60.  Notably, this is the case even though in the scenario the incomes of existing 
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primary graduates remain substantially higher than the new entrants: $10 compared to $3 for new 
entrants. 
 It is also possible that primary education has a negative return for new entrants—perhaps 
because, while attending school, they forego the opportunity to acquire traditional skills.  We capture this 
possibility in the fourth scenario, in which new primary graduates earn $1 per day, half what they would 
have earned as adults if they had not gone to school.  Inequality here rises to a Gini of .66.  Although 
theoretically possible, however, scenario 4—like scenarios 1 and 2—is less realistic, since returns to 
primary education in the developing world are typically positive, if only modestly so (Schultz, 2004). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 In sum, while it is theoretically possible for inequality to fall after an increase in the primary 
enrollment rate, our most realistic scenario, scenario 3, has inequality rising substantially.  Why is this 
realistic?  Because the politically constrained policymakers who govern developing countries have a strong 
interest in protecting the earnings of elite university graduates, the vast majority of whom come from 
wealthy families whose political support these leaders need to stay in power.  Education budgets are likely 
to remain heavily biased toward universities, then, even when primary enrollments rise.  And because the 
underfunded primary schools one finds in “tilted” political economies are too poorly staffed—and too 
poorly equipped generally—to accommodate an influx of new students, the push to raise these countries’ 
primary enrollment rates could end up lifting, rather than lowering, their long-run rates of inequality. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 We began this paper with a puzzle.  We showed empirically that higher primary enrollment is 
associated in developing countries with higher, not lower, future inequality.  This association runs 
contrary to much of the conventional wisdom, which sees primary education enabling the poor to catch 
up to the rich.  We further showed that this relationship depends on the educational spending patterns 
prevalent in developing countries.  In developing countries that focus their educational resources on 
primary students rather than students in their secondary schools and universities, increases in primary 
enrollment are associated with significantly lower inequality a decade later.  But these governments are the 
exceptions: most of the time, and across most of the developing world, governments concentrate their 
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education spending on students in the upper levels.  And in these countries, higher primary enrollment 
today is strongly associated with much higher future inequality. 
 We laid out some of the factors that may lie behind these associations.  The tertiary tilt may be a 
political necessity for the leaders of many developing countries.  And where educational resources are 
concentrated on students in higher education instead of primary students, it may be difficult to expand 
primary enrollment while maintaining quality for existing primary students.  Exacerbating the problem are 
the limited returns to primary-educated workers in capital-poor developing countries where primary 
education is already abundant.  We leave a more thorough examination of these and other explanations 
for future research.  Here our purpose is rather to document a robust association between current 
primary enrollment and future inequality in countries with high tertiary tilts—an association that has 
important implications for the international community’s current campaign to promote basic education.  
Developing countries have made tremendous progress in raising primary enrollment rates.  But it is not 
enough to enroll primary students.  They must also be educated—and a high-quality education costs 
money. 
 Eliciting that money for the sake of equality (or out of regard for education’s contribution to 
societal well-being more broadly) may require an equally vigorous new campaign, this one aimed at “re-
tilting” the political priorities of developing country governments.37  Many of these governments have 
been receptive to the idea of expanding primary enrollments.  Perhaps they should now be encouraged to 
devote greater attention—and funding—to primary education as a whole, even if that means diverting 
resources away from their countries’ elite universities.  Without that re-tilting, the international 
community’s well-intentioned push for universal primary education could paradoxically end up increasing 
inequality throughout much of the developing world. 
                                                     
37 Tertiary-tilted spending priorities may have other consequences as well, of course, beyond their impact 
on inequality.  Our hope is that this analysis will stimulate a wider investigation of the tilt’s causes and internal 
dynamics (which are what we began to address in Section 4) as well as its broader effects—e.g., for long-run 
economic growth.  On the growth effects of primary versus tertiary education, see Denison (1962), Harbison and 
Myers (1964), Ahmed and Blaug (1973), Psacharopoulos (1973, 1981, 1994), and Schultz (2004). 
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Figure 1 - Primary Enrollment’s Marginal Effect on Inequality As Tilt Shifts from Primary to Tertiary  
 
Note: Dashed lines represent the 95-percent confidence interval. 
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  The Distribution of Adult Earnings in a Stylized 10-Person Society 
(dollars per day) 
 Status Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario 
 Quo I II III IV 
  $60 $45 $60 $60 $60 
  $60 $45 $60 $60 $60 
  $20 $10 $20 $10 $10 
  $20 $10 $20 $10 $10 
  $20 $10 $20 $10 $10 
  $2 $3 $3 $3 $1 
  $2 $3 $3 $3 $1 
  $2 $3 $3 $3 $1 
  $2 $3 $3 $3 $1 
  $2 $2 $2 $2 $2 
     
    gini    gini   gini   gini   gini 
    0.57    0.56    0.55   0.60   0.66 
 
Figure 2 - Inequality after an expansion of primary enrollment in four alternative scenarios 
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Table 1 - The Impact of Lagged Primary Enrollment on Current Inequality 
Sample: 5-Year Averages from 1967 to 2007 5-Year Averages from 1965 to 2005 
Annual 
Data 
	 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PrimEnroll	t	–	10   
.041*** 
(.011) 
.020** 
(.010) 
.021*** 
(.008) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	  -.220*** (.048) 
-.328*** 
(.075) 
-.589*** 
(.081) 
-.130*** 
(.032) 
M2	 .045*** (.006) 
.040*** 
(.006) 
.041*** 
(.009) 
.038*** 
(.007) 
.018*** 
(.006) 
Democracy	 -.0012 (.0016) 
-.004 
(.007) 
-.019 
(.014) 
-.030* 
(.018) 
-.003 
(.003) 
GDPpc	 .0016*** (.0001) 
.0014*** 
(.0001) 
.0019*** 
(.0001) 
.0011*** 
(.0002) 
.0007*** 
(.0002) 
Land	 9.29*** (2.98) 
12.48*** 
(2.53) 
15.04*** 
(2.74) 
15.73*** 
(2.60) 
5.25** 
(2.23) 
Growth	 -.076*** (.028) 
-.021 
(.029) 
-.039 
(.027) 
.021 
(.050) 
-.0028 
(.014) 
Constant		 23.16*** (.89) 
23.69*** 
(.79) 
19.12*** 
(1.49) 
23.57*** 
(1.25) 
25.14*** 
(1.26) 
Country	Fixed	Effects	      
Country	N	 72 72 72 69 80 
Total	N	 245 245 245 220 895 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level  ** Significant at the 5 percent level  * Significant at the 10 percent level 
Notes: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient, as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  Estimation method is FGLS 
(robust standard errors are shown in parentheses).  Results are displayed for three different samples: 5-year averages over the period stretching 
from 1967 to 2007, 5-year averages over the period from 1965 to 2005, and yearly data.  PrimEnroll	is the primary enrollment ratio.  TotEduExp	is 
education spending as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table 2 - Enrollments and Spending by Region, 1990s 
A.  Gross Enrollment Ratios 
 GDP per capita Primary Secondary Tertiary 
South Asia $528 101% 43% 5% 
Sub-Saharan Africa $879 80% 25% 3% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia $2,640 97% 84% 27% 
Latin American and Caribbean $4,039 105% 58% 19% 
East Asia and Pacific $5,536 106% 56% 15% 
Middle East and North Africa $5,756 92% 64% 16% 
OECD $26,020 103% 109% 47% 
   
B.  Per student spending (% of GDP per capita) 
 GDP per capita Primary Secondary Tertiary 
South Asia $528 10% 13% 101% 
Sub-Saharan Africa $879 14% 41% 402% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia $2,640 24% 21% 37% 
Latin American and Caribbean $4,039 8% 13% 42% 
East Asia and Pacific $5,536 9% 16% 96% 
Middle East and North Africa $5,756 16% 22% 71% 
OECD $26,020 19% 22% 36% 
   
C.*  Proportion of the education budget devoted to: 
 GDP per capita Primary Secondary Tertiary 
South Asia $528 53% 27% 21% 
Sub-Saharan Africa $879 49% 29% 22% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia $2,640 43% 38% 19% 
Latin American and Caribbean $4,039 46% 31% 23% 
East Asia and Pacific $5,536 45% 36% 19% 
Middle East and North Africa $5,756 39% 44% 16% 
OECD $26,020 30% 45% 25% 
Source: World Development Indicators.  GDP per capita is in constant 1995 US dollars.   
* Figures in panel C are authors’ calculations based on per-student spending, enrollment, and GDP figures from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  They thus omit any education spending not targeted at a 
particular education level (such as central administration). 
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Table 3 - Results using FGLS Estimation with AR(1) Correction 
Sample: 5-Year Averages from 1967 to 2007 5-Year Averages from 1965 to 2005 
Annual 
Data 
	 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PrimEnrollStd	t	–	10	
 
.884*** 
(.229) 
3.105*** 
(.431) 
-3.218*** 
(1.235) 
-4.713*** 
(1.142) 
-1.123*** 
(.409) 
TerTilt	t	–	10	
  
.634 
(.483) 
.153 
(.487) 
.615 
(.565) 
1.011*** 
(.309) 
PrimEnrollStd	t‐10	x TerTilt	t	‐	10	
	   
2.647*** 
(.444) 
3.450*** 
(.431) 
1.548*** 
(.138) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	
	
-.328*** 
(.075) 
.006 
(.205) 
-.295 
(.263) 
.132 
(.405) 
-.028 
(.097) 
M2	
	
.041*** 
(.009) 
-.052*** 
(.015) 
-.047** 
(.018) 
-.054* 
(.031) 
-.012 
(.011) 
Democracy	
	
-.019 
(.014) 
.089*** 
(.024) 
-.135*** 
(.012) 
-.190*** 
(.033) 
.002 
(.004) 
GDPpc	
	
.0019*** 
(.0001) 
.0018*** 
(.0002) 
.0018*** 
(.0004) 
.0019*** 
(.0007) 
.0010*** 
(.0002) 
Land	
	
15.04*** 
(2.74) 
11.76** 
(5.06) 
23.66*** 
(4.83) 
2.55 
(5.60) 
8.21** 
(3.88) 
Growth	
	
-.039 
(.027) 
.042 
(.029) 
.0006 
(.0652) 
-.0036 
(.0933) 
-.053* 
(.031) 
Constant		
	
23.08*** 
(.83) 
37.24*** 
3.06 
13.85*** 
(4.25) 
37.63*** 
(5.39) 
24.69*** 
(3.37) 
Country	Fixed	Effects	      
Country	N	 72 27 27 22 27 
Total	N	 245 83 83 62 279 
Notes: See Table 1.  (PrimEnrollStd	is the primary enrollment ratio normalized across all countries for which we have data.) 
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Table 4 - Results using FGLS Random-Effects Estimation with Robust Standard Errors 
	 Sample: 5-Year Averages from 1967 to 2007 
5-Year Averages 
from 1965 to 2005 
Annual 
Data 
	 	 (11) (12) (13) 
Within-Country 
Effects 
PrimEnrollStd	t	–	10	
 
-3.19 
(2.51) 
-1.99 
(2.43) 
-4.00* 
(2.36) 
TerTilt	t	–	10	
 
.50 
(1.68) 
.13 
(.07) 
.89 
(1.37) 
PrimEnrollStd	t‐10	x TerTilt	t	‐	10	
	
2.59** 
(1.03) 
2.64** 
(1.11) 
2.68*** 
(1.03) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	
	
.12 
(.77) 
-.89 
(.93) 
-.34 
(.50) 
M2	
	
-.05 
(.04) 
-.07 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.04) 
Democracy	
	
-.11*** 
(.03) 
-.14* 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.01) 
GDPpc	
	
.0013* 
(.0007) 
.0006 
(.0012) 
.0003 
(.0007) 
Land	
	
19.24 
(11.77) 
10.51 
(20.95) 
4.84 
(15.23) 
Growth	
	
-.13 
(.15) 
-.02 
(.23) 
-.05 
(.13) 
Between-Country 
Effects 
PrimEnrollStd	t	–	10	
 
-2.24 
(4.06) 
-1.45 
(3.67) 
5.20 
(4.20) 
TerTilt	t	–	10	
 
2.79** 
(1.35) 
3.77*** 
(1.36) 
2.98*** 
(.95) 
PrimEnrollStd	t‐10	x TerTilt	t	‐	10	
	
1.59 
(1.69) 
1.68 
(1.21) 
-1.29 
(1.43) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	
	
-1.17 
(.99) 
-1.12 
(.87) 
-.44 
(1.02) 
M2	
	
-.01 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.06) 
-.007 
(.052) 
Democracy	
	
.34 
(.28) 
.08 
(.23) 
.35 
(.23) 
GDPpc	
	
-.0001 
(.0004) 
.0004 
(.0005) 
-.0002 
(.0004) 
Land	
	
-3.65 
(7.28) 
3.90 
(7.67) 
-4.47 
(8.87) 
Growth	
	
-.29 
(1.00) 
-.16 
(.91) 
.36 
(.59) 
	 Constant			
44.05*** 
(4.80) 
39.48*** 
(6.12) 
39.18*** 
(4.83) 
	 Country	N	 45 44 38 
	 Total	N	 101 84 290 
Notes: See Table 1.  (PrimEnrollStd	is the primary enrollment ratio normalized across all countries for 
which we have data.) 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 - Summary Statistics for Sample Using 5-Year Averages Beginning in 1967 
	 N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gini	 159 43.5 9.2 23.3 60.7 
P90Share	 159 34.2 7.2 19.2 51.0 
P90P10	 159 22.6 20.4 4.6 168.5 
PrimEnroll	 159 98.1 19.3 32.3 146.7 
PrimEnrollStd	 159 0.09 0.90 -2.98 2.35 
TerTilt	 159 1.64 1.30 -1.17 6.09 
TerSecoTilt	 148 1.93 1.07 -0.43 6.11 
TotEduExp	 159 4.16 1.44 1.20 9.34 
M2	 159 34.8 20.8 7.07 125.03 
Democracy	 159 2.51 8.34 -52.4 10.0 
Land	 159 0.27 0.20 0.04 1.50 
GDPpc	 159 2,287 2,519 108 18,396 
Growth	 159 1.65 3.23 -16.59 9.22 
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Table A2 - Summary Statistics for Sample with Yearly Data  
	 N Mean Standard. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gini	 210 44.6 9.6 25.5 63.2 
P90Share	 210 34.9 7.6 20.2 51.0 
P90P10	 210 25.2 21.7 5.0 168.5 
PrimEnroll	 210 102.3 15.1 37.5 166.0 
PrimEnrollStd	 210 0.28 0.70 -2.74 3.24 
TerTilt	 210 1.39 1.21 -1.16 6.85 
TerSecoTilt	 210 1.77 1.05 -0.51 6.85 
TotEduExp	 210 4.25 1.41 1.15 10.30 
M2	 210 35.0 21.1 6.7 116.8 
Democracy	 210 4.22 8.62 -88.0 10.0 
Land	 210 0.28 0.22 0.04 1.53 
GDPpc	 210 2,664 2,326 116 18,674 
Growth	 210 2.06 3.39 -13.50 9.30 
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Table A3 - Verification of Table 1 Results Using the P90Share Measure of Inequality 
Sample: 5-Year Averages from 1967 to 2007 5-Year Averages from 1965 to 2005 
Annual 
Data 
PrimEnroll	t	–	10   
.042*** 
(.010) 
.028*** 
(.007) 
.010 
(.007) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	  -.293*** (.049) 
-.384*** 
(.034) 
-.61*** 
(.07) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
M2	 .0202*** (.0067) 
.013 
(.009) 
.013 
(.010) 
.027*** 
(.009) 
.009** 
(.005) 
Democracy	 -.0003 (.0098) 
-.0005 
(.0096) 
.0036 
(.0119) 
-.024** 
(.010) 
.003 
(.003) 
GDPpc	 .00077*** (.00017) 
.0011*** 
(.0002) 
.0016*** 
(.0001) 
.00054*** 
(.00017) 
.0005*** 
(.0001) 
Land	 -1.50 (1.49) 
5.87*** 
(1.94) 
6.83*** 
(1.28) 
11.13*** 
(2.87) 
1.72 
(1.84) 
Growth	 -.043* (.023) 
-.028** 
(.014) 
-.050 
(.011) 
.064 
(.039) 
-.029* 
(.016) 
Constant		 21.10*** (.54) 
21.15*** 
(.74) 
16.55*** 
(1.32) 
18.61*** 
(1.34) 
21.26*** 
(1.00) 
Country	Fixed	Effects	      
Country	N	 82 72 72 69 80 
Total	N	 286 245 245 220 895 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level  ** Significant at the 5 percent level  * Significant at the 10 percent level 
Notes: The dependent variable is percentage of a country’s total income accruing to households in its highest income decile, as reported in the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database.  Estimation method is FGLS (robust standard errors are shown in parentheses).  Results are displayed for three different samples: 5-year averages 
over the period stretching from 1967 to 2007, 5-year averages over the period from 1965 to 2005, and yearly data.  PrimEnroll	is the primary enrollment ratio.  
TotEduExp	is education spending as a percentage of GDP. 
 - 40 - 
Table A4 - Verification of Table 1 Results Using P90:P10 Ratio Instead of Gini Indicator of Inequality 
Sample: 5-Year Averages from 1967 to 2007 5-Year Averages from 1965 to 2005 
Annual 
Data 
PrimEnroll	t	–	10   
.050** 
(.022) 
.023* 
(.012) 
.020* 
(.011) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	  .184 (.133) 
-.283** 
(.119) 
-.396*** 
(.082) 
-.123*** 
(.046) 
M2	 .266*** (.010) 
.243*** 
(.020) 
.213*** 
(.018) 
.209*** 
(.021) 
.053*** 
(.009) 
Democracy	 -.033*** (.011) 
-.044*** 
(.006) 
-.041*** 
(.014) 
-.154*** 
(.020) 
-.0000 
(.0029) 
GDPpc	 -.0014*** (.0003) 
-.0011*** 
(.0003) 
-.0006*** 
(.0002) 
-.0016*** 
(.0004) 
.0001 
(.0003) 
Land	 7.39** (2.99) 
17.47*** 
(4.53) 
23.19*** 
(5.09) 
21.04*** 
(4.38) 
11.31*** 
(2.87) 
Growth	 -.038 (.023) 
.212*** 
(.046) 
.213*** 
(.053) 
.024 
(.050) 
.038 
(.028) 
Constant		 -9.05*** (1.07) 
-12.25*** 
(1.88) 
-15.15*** 
(3.73) 
-7.25*** 
(2.14) 
-.77 
(1.58) 
Country	Fixed	Effects	      
Country	N	 82 72 72 69 80 
Total	N	 286 245 245 220 895 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of a country’s income distribution, as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database.  Estimation method is FGLS (robust standard errors are shown in parentheses).  Results are displayed for three different samples: 5-year averages over the 
period stretching from 1967 to 2007, 5-year averages over the period from 1965 to 2005, and yearly data.  PrimEnroll	is the primary enrollment ratio.  TotEduExp	is 
education spending as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table A5 - Verification of Tables 3 and 4 Using the P90Share and P90:P10 Measures of Inequality 
Dependent Variable: P90Share P90:P10	Ratio 
 FGLS with Fixed Effects 
FGLS 
with Random Effects 
FGLS 
with Fixed Effects 
FGLS 
with Random Effects 
PrimEnrollStd	t	–	10 
-1.86* 
(.98) 
-2.23 
(2.06) 
-7.33*** 
(2.11) 
-5.88 
(6.30) 
TerTilt	t	–	10 
-.07 
(.37) 
.37 
(1.42) 
.49 
(1.20) 
-1.39 
(4.96) 
PrimEnrollStd	t‐10	x TerTilt	t	‐	10	 1.95*** (.30) 
2.04*** 
(.71) 
4.27*** 
(.42) 
3.68*** 
(1.41) 
TotEduExp	t	–	10	 -.13 (.18) 
.293 
(.686) 
.48** 
(.20) 
.17 
(1.30) 
M2	 -.06*** (.01) 
-.06** 
(.03) 
-.072*** 
(.030) 
-.09 
(.14) 
Democracy	 -.11*** (.01) 
-.09*** 
(.03) 
-.21** 
(.09) 
-.24 
(.17) 
GDPpc	 .0017*** (.0003) 
.0015** 
(.0006) 
.0012* 
(.0007) 
.0002 
(.0022) 
Land	 18.36*** (2.38) 
14.11 
(10.35) 
-5.92 
(14.19) 
-1.01 
(45.81) 
Growth	 -.03 (.05) 
-.13 
(.11) 
-.30*** 
(.10) 
-.28 
(.49) 
Constant		 8.99** (3.52) 
34.81*** 
(3.75) 
47.29*** 
(7.51) 
32.39*** 
(10.19) 
Specification	includes	country	fixed	effects	     
Specification	parcels	out	between‐	&	within‐country	effects	as	
described	in	text	     
Country	N	 27 16 27 45 
Total	N	 83 29 83 101 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level  ** Significant at the 5 percent level  * Significant at the 10 percent level 
Notes: See Tables 3 and 4.  The dependent variables for this table are P90Share (the percentage of a country’s total income accruing to households in its highest income decile) and 
P90:P10 (the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of a country’s income distribution), both as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  Columns for 
random effects specifications display coefficients and standard errors for within-country regressors only.  All samples are 5-year averages from 1967 to 2007.  
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Table A6 - TerTilt Values for Sample Using 5-Year Averages Beginning in 1967 
Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Kenya 1992-1996 6.09 
Malawi 1977-1981 5.39 
Malawi 1982-1986 5.22 
Malawi 1992-1996 5.21 
Malawi 1972-1976 5.18 
Ghana 1967-1971 5.09 
Malawi 1987-1991 4.99 
Ghana 1972-1976 4.86 
Kenya 1987-1991 4.82 
Nigeria 1967-1971 4.72 
Lesotho 1977-1981 4.72 
Kenya 1997-2001 4.64 
Rwanda 1967-1971 4.63 
Ghana 1977-1981 4.53 
Togo 1982-1986 4.50 
Rwanda 1992-1996 4.46 
Rwanda 1997-2001 4.45 
Rwanda 1987-1991 4.44 
Rwanda 1982-1986 4.42 
Burundi 1997-2001 4.41 
Lesotho 1982-1986 4.36 
Togo 1977-1981 4.36 
Rwanda 1977-1981 4.31 
Botswana 1972-1976 4.29 
Congo Rep. 1977-1981 4.29 
Togo 1987-1991 4.28 
Zambia 1992-1996 4.22 
Rwanda 1972-1976 4.21 
Ghana 1982-1986 4.19 
Botswana 1977-1981 4.19 
Congo Rep. 1982-1986 4.14 
Eritrea 2002-2006 4.13 
Togo 1992-1996 4.13 
Congo Rep. 1972-1976 4.13 
China 1977-1981 4.09 
Chad 2002-2006 4.03 
Botswana 1982-1986 4.01 
Congo Rep. 1987-1991 3.99 
Guinea 1987-1991 3.97 
Kenya 1982-1986 3.93 
Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Rwanda 2002-2006 3.91 
Lesotho 1987-1991 3.88 
Ethiopia 2002-2006 3.87 
Ghana 1987-1991 3.86 
Congo Rep. 1992-1996 3.85 
Chad 1997-2001 3.82 
Cent. Afr. Rep. 2002-2006 3.71 
Congo Rep. 1997-2001 3.70 
Bhutan 1997-2001 3.69 
Lesotho 2002-2006 3.68 
Swaziland 1997-2001 3.67 
Swaziland 1987-1991 3.64 
Ethiopia 1997-2001 3.63 
Chad 1992-1996 3.62 
Lesotho 1992-1996 3.60 
Swaziland 1992-1996 3.58 
Lesotho 1997-2001 3.57 
China 1982-1986 3.55 
Ghana 1992-1996 3.53 
Mozambique 2002-2006 3.46 
Zambia 1997-2001 3.46 
Togo 1997-2001 3.44 
Congo Rep. 2002-2006 3.44 
The Gambia 2002-2006 3.43 
Botswana 1987-1991 3.39 
Congo Rep. 1967-1971 3.39 
Eritrea 1997-2001 3.36 
Belize 2002-2006 3.34 
Burundi 2002-2006 3.33 
Botswana 2002-2006 3.30 
Swaziland 1982-1986 3.28 
Guyana 1982-1986 3.28 
Swaziland 2002-2006 3.27 
Mali 1992-1996 3.24 
The Gambia 1997-2001 3.24 
Ethiopia 1982-1986 3.23 
India 1967-1971 3.23 
Botswana 1997-2001 3.22 
Ghana 1997-2001 3.19 
Burkina Faso 1992-1996 3.19 
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Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Thailand 1967-1971 3.16 
Mauritania 1987-1991 3.14 
Botswana 1992-1996 3.14 
China 1987-1991 3.12 
India 1972-1976 3.11 
Togo 1972-1976 3.10 
Ethiopia 1992-1996 3.07 
The Gambia 1992-1996 3.05 
Madagascar 2002-2006 3.04 
Benin 1992-1996 2.96 
Senegal 1992-1996 2.96 
Madagascar 1997-2001 2.96 
Samoa 1997-2001 2.95 
India 1977-1981 2.95 
Vietnam 1992-1996 2.94 
Senegal 1997-2001 2.93 
Mali 1997-2001 2.91 
Ethiopia 1987-1991 2.90 
Mauritania 1992-1996 2.90 
Lao PDR 1997-2001 2.89 
Ghana 2002-2006 2.89 
Zimbabwe 1992-1996 2.89 
Senegal 1987-1991 2.89 
Guyana 1987-1991 2.88 
Zimbabwe 1972-1976 2.85 
Senegal 1982-1986 2.84 
Uganda 2002-2006 2.82 
Mauritius 1987-1991 2.82 
India 1982-1986 2.79 
Zimbabwe 1977-1981 2.77 
Zimbabwe 1997-2001 2.77 
Mauritius 1982-1986 2.73 
Vanuatu 1997-2001 2.70 
Trinidad & 1987-1991 2.69 
Jamaica 1977-1981 2.67 
Senegal 2002-2006 2.65 
Mauritius 1992-1996 2.64 
Burkina Faso 1997-2001 2.64 
India 1987-1991 2.62 
Venezuela 1987-1991 2.62 
Jamaica 1982-1986 2.61 
China 1992-1996 2.57 
Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Tonga 2002-2006 2.57 
Nepal 1997-2001 2.56 
Niger 2002-2006 2.56 
Nepal 1992-1996 2.56 
Trinidad & 1992-1996 2.56 
Benin 1997-2001 2.53 
Venezuela 1977-1981 2.51 
Jamaica 1987-1991 2.51 
Kuwait 1967-1971 2.50 
Venezuela 1982-1986 2.46 
Paraguay 1987-1991 2.46 
India 1992-1996 2.46 
Paraguay 1982-1986 2.45 
Iran 1987-1991 2.45 
Thailand 1972-1976 2.45 
Kenya 2002-2006 2.43 
China 1997-2001 2.41 
Guatemala 1987-1991 2.39 
Venezuela 1992-1996 2.39 
Cote d'Ivoire 1997-2001 2.38 
Chile 1977-1981 2.36 
Benin 2002-2006 2.35 
Myanmar 1997-2001 2.34 
Comoros 1997-2001 2.32 
Cambodia 1997-2001 2.31 
Guyana 1992-1996 2.30 
Guatemala 1982-1986 2.30 
Iran 1982-1986 2.29 
Mauritania 1997-2001 2.27 
Armenia 1997-2001 2.27 
Morocco 1972-1976 2.25 
Trinidad & 1997-2001 2.24 
Guatemala 1977-1981 2.21 
Gabon 1997-2001 2.21 
Cameroon 2002-2006 2.17 
Togo 1967-1971 2.17 
Lao PDR 1992-1996 2.17 
Qatar 1972-1976 2.16 
Morocco 1977-1981 2.15 
Guatemala 1972-1976 2.12 
Jamaica 1992-1996 2.10 
Paraguay 1992-1996 2.10 
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Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Zimbabwe 1987-1991 2.09 
Colombia 1977-1981 2.09 
Kuwait 2002-2006 2.08 
Cameroon 1997-2001 2.06 
Guatemala 1967-1971 2.06 
Cyprus 1972-1976 2.04 
Cape Verde 2002-2006 2.03 
Burkina Faso 2002-2006 2.02 
Morocco 1982-1986 2.02 
Mexico 1982-1986 2.01 
India 1997-2001 2.00 
Venezuela 1997-2001 2.00 
Thailand 1977-1981 1.97 
Malaysia 1997-2001 1.95 
Malaysia 1992-1996 1.94 
Mexico 1987-1991 1.94 
Mauritius 1997-2001 1.92 
Morocco 1987-1991 1.88 
Colombia 1982-1986 1.88 
Guatemala 1992-1996 1.88 
Myanmar 1992-1996 1.87 
India 2002-2006 1.86 
Kuwait 1972-1976 1.83 
Macao, China 1997-2001 1.83 
Mexico 1977-1981 1.82 
Nepal 2002-2006 1.81 
Kuwait 1997-2001 1.81 
Zimbabwe 1982-1986 1.78 
Costa Rica 1987-1991 1.77 
Namibia 1997-2001 1.77 
Kuwait 1992-1996 1.74 
Morocco 1992-1996 1.74 
Guyana 1997-2001 1.73 
Morocco 1997-2001 1.71 
Namibia 2002-2006 1.70 
Cuba 1992-1996 1.70 
Bangladesh 1997-2001 1.70 
Lao PDR 2002-2006 1.68 
Kuwait 1987-1991 1.68 
Jamaica 1997-2001 1.68 
Bangladesh 2002-2006 1.68 
Chile 1982-1986 1.67 
Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Brazil 1997-2001 1.64 
Paraguay 1997-2001 1.63 
Mauritania 2002-2006 1.62 
Malaysia 2002-2006 1.61 
Tunisia 1997-2001 1.61 
Venezuela 2002-2006 1.61 
Bolivia 1992-1996 1.59 
Mexico 1992-1996 1.58 
U.A.E. 1997-2001 1.58 
Colombia 1987-1991 1.58 
Albania 2002-2006 1.55 
Malta 1997-2001 1.54 
Morocco 2002-2006 1.53 
Thailand 1982-1986 1.53 
Guatemala 1997-2001 1.53 
Costa Rica 1992-1996 1.51 
Israel 1977-1981 1.49 
Dominican 1982-1986 1.48 
Hong Kong 2002-2006 1.46 
Iran 1992-1996 1.43 
South Africa 1997-2001 1.39 
Guatemala 2002-2006 1.39 
Pap. N. Guinea 1997-2001 1.36 
U.A.E. 2002-2006 1.35 
Cyprus 1977-1981 1.35 
Kuwait 1977-1981 1.34 
Cuba 1997-2001 1.31 
Mexico 1997-2001 1.30 
Chile 1987-1991 1.29 
Mauritius 2002-2006 1.29 
Fiji 2002-2006 1.28 
South Africa 2002-2006 1.28 
Bolivia 1997-2001 1.28 
Colombia 1992-1996 1.28 
Jamaica 2002-2006 1.27 
Macedonia, 1992-1996 1.26 
Israel 1982-1986 1.26 
Costa Rica 1997-2001 1.24 
Tunisia 2002-2006 1.23 
Brazil 2002-2006 1.22 
Macao, China 2002-2006 1.17 
Guyana 2002-2006 1.15 
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Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Marshall Islands 2002-2006 1.14 
Peru 1997-2001 1.11 
Uruguay 1977-1981 1.11 
Barbados 1997-2001 1.10 
Ukraine 1997-2001 1.09 
Mexico 2002-2006 1.08 
Uruguay 1982-1986 1.08 
Panama 2002-2006 1.08 
Bulgaria 1977-1981 1.06 
Kuwait 1982-1986 1.05 
Uruguay 1987-1991 1.04 
Thailand 1987-1991 1.04 
Kyrgyz Rep. 1997-2001 1.03 
Malta 2002-2006 1.02 
Kyrgyz Rep. 2002-2006 1.01 
Cyprus 1997-2001 1.01 
Israel 1987-1991 1.00 
Uruguay 1992-1996 0.99 
Romania 1997-2001 0.99 
Colombia 1997-2001 0.97 
Ukraine 2002-2006 0.97 
Iran 2002-2006 0.97 
Panama 1997-2001 0.97 
Oman 1992-1996 0.97 
Bulgaria 1982-1986 0.95 
Costa Rica 2002-2006 0.95 
Oman 1997-2001 0.92 
Bolivia 2002-2006 0.92 
Peru 1992-1996 0.92 
Uruguay 1997-2001 0.89 
Uruguay 2002-2006 0.89 
Aruba 1997-2001 0.89 
Chile 1992-1996 0.87 
Thailand 1997-2001 0.87 
Aruba 2002-2006 0.87 
Andorra 2002-2006 0.85 
Jordan 1997-2001 0.82 
Paraguay 2002-2006 0.82 
Romania 2002-2006 0.81 
Slovenia 1987-1991 0.79 
Lebanon 2002-2006 0.79 
Iran 1997-2001 0.77 
Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Cyprus 1982-1986 0.77 
El Salvador 1997-2001 0.75 
Cyprus 2002-2006 0.72 
Slovenia 1992-1996 0.69 
Thailand 1992-1996 0.67 
Tajikistan 2002-2006 0.66 
Israel 1992-1996 0.64 
Palau 1997-2001 0.60 
Belarus 2002-2006 0.59 
Thailand 2002-2006 0.55 
Peru 2002-2006 0.53 
Cuba 2002-2006 0.53 
Azerbaijan 2002-2006 0.53 
Philippines 1992-1996 0.49 
Bulgaria 1987-1991 0.48 
Cyprus 1992-1996 0.47 
Romania 1992-1996 0.43 
Chile 1997-2001 0.43 
Israel 1997-2001 0.38 
Argentina 1997-2001 0.38 
Colombia 2002-2006 0.37 
Romania 1987-1991 0.36 
Estonia 1997-2001 0.36 
El Salvador 2002-2006 0.35 
El Salvador 1992-1996 0.35 
Oman 2002-2006 0.35 
Philippines 1997-2001 0.33 
Croatia 2002-2006 0.33 
Philippines 2002-2006 0.26 
Mongolia 2002-2006 0.25 
Slovenia 1997-2001 0.24 
Lithuania 2002-2006 0.24 
Bulgaria 2002-2006 0.24 
Cyprus 1987-1991 0.24 
Latvia 1997-2001 0.19 
Israel 2002-2006 0.19 
Peru 1987-1991 0.15 
Estonia 2002-2006 0.11 
Chile 2002-2006 0.07 
Argentina 2002-2006 0.06 
Ukraine 1987-1991 0.02 
Azerbaijan 1997-2001 0.02 
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Country 5-Year TerTilt 
Peru 1967-1971 0.01 
Bulgaria 1997-2001 -0.02 
Slovenia 2002-2006 -0.08 
Bulgaria 1992-1996 -0.18 
Belarus 1997-2001 -0.19 
Lithuania 1997-2001 -0.19 
Peru 1972-1976 -0.28 
South Korea 1982-1986 -0.30 
Kazakhstan 2002-2006 -0.34 
Latvia 2002-2006 -0.34 
Azerbaijan 1992-1996 -0.36 
Belarus 1987-1991 -0.37 
Peru 1977-1981 -0.38 
Peru 1982-1986 -0.41 
Ukraine 1992-1996 -0.51 
South Korea 1987-1991 -0.63 
Belarus 1992-1996 -0.87 
South Korea 2002-2006 -0.88 
South Korea 1992-1996 -1.03 
South Korea 1997-2001 -1.17 
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Table A7 - TerTilt Values for Yearly Sample:  Ordered from Highest to Lowest 
Country Year TerTilt 
Kenya 1998 7.10 
Kenya 1997 6.85 
Kenya 1996 6.59 
Kenya 1995 6.34 
Kenya 1994 6.09 
Kenya 1993 5.83 
Malawi 1994 5.80 
Kenya 1992 5.58 
Malawi 1980 5.49 
Malawi 1981 5.42 
Malawi 1979 5.42 
Malawi 1982 5.35 
Malawi 1978 5.35 
Kenya 1991 5.33 
Malawi 1983 5.29 
Malawi 1977 5.28 
Malawi 1984 5.22 
Malawi 1976 5.21 
Malawi 1995 5.20 
Malawi 1985 5.16 
Malawi 1975 5.15 
Ghana 1970 5.13 
Malawi 1986 5.10 
Malawi 1991 5.09 
Kenya 1990 5.07 
Ghana 1971 5.06 
Malawi 1987 5.04 
Malawi 1993 5.00 
Ghana 1972 4.99 
Malawi 1988 4.99 
Malawi 1989 4.93 
Ghana 1973 4.93 
Malawi 1990 4.88 
Ghana 1974 4.86 
Malawi 1992 4.82 
Kenya 1989 4.82 
Ghana 1975 4.79 
Lesotho 1980 4.77 
Ghana 1976 4.73 
Eritrea 2004 4.72 
Country Year TerTilt 
Nigeria 1970 4.72 
Rwanda 1970 4.70 
Togo 1980 4.68 
Lesotho 1981 4.67 
Kenya 1999 4.66 
Ghana 1977 4.66 
Togo 1981 4.64 
Ghana 1978 4.59 
Togo 1982 4.59 
Kenya 1988 4.57 
Rwanda 1971 4.56 
Lesotho 1982 4.56 
Togo 1983 4.55 
Ghana 1979 4.53 
Togo 1984 4.50 
Rwanda 2000 4.48 
Rwanda 1999 4.48 
Rwanda 1998 4.47 
Rwanda 1997 4.47 
Rwanda 1996 4.47 
Rwanda 1995 4.46 
Ghana 1980 4.46 
Lesotho 1983 4.46 
Rwanda 1994 4.46 
Togo 1985 4.46 
Rwanda 1993 4.45 
Rwanda 1992 4.45 
Rwanda 1991 4.45 
Rwanda 1990 4.44 
Zambia 1994 4.44 
Rwanda 1989 4.44 
Rwanda 1988 4.43 
Rwanda 1972 4.43 
Rwanda 1987 4.43 
Rwanda 1986 4.42 
Rwanda 1985 4.42 
Togo 1979 4.42 
Rwanda 1984 4.42 
Burundi 2001 4.42 
Burundi 2000 4.41 
Country Year TerTilt 
Togo 1986 4.41 
Rwanda 1983 4.41 
Rwanda 1982 4.41 
Congo Rep. 1975 4.40 
Rwanda 1981 4.40 
Rwanda 1980 4.40 
Ghana 1981 4.39 
Congo Rep. 1976 4.37 
Togo 1987 4.37 
Lesotho 1984 4.35 
Congo Rep. 1977 4.35 
Ghana 1982 4.33 
Rwanda 1979 4.33 
Togo 1988 4.32 
Rwanda 2001 4.32 
Congo Rep. 1978 4.32 
Kenya 1987 4.31 
Botswana 1975 4.31 
Rwanda 1973 4.30 
Congo Rep. 1979 4.29 
Botswana 1976 4.28 
Togo 1989 4.28 
Ghana 1983 4.26 
Congo Rep. 1980 4.26 
Rwanda 1978 4.25 
Lesotho 1985 4.25 
Botswana 1977 4.25 
Togo 1990 4.23 
Congo Rep. 1981 4.23 
Zambia 1995 4.22 
Togo 1991 4.22 
Botswana 1978 4.22 
Chad 2003 4.21 
Togo 1992 4.20 
Congo Rep. 1982 4.20 
Ghana 1984 4.19 
Togo 1993 4.19 
Botswana 1979 4.19 
Rwanda 1977 4.18 
Congo Rep. 1974 4.18 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Togo 1994 4.18 
China 1980 4.17 
Congo Rep. 1983 4.17 
Rwanda 1974 4.17 
Togo 1995 4.16 
Lesotho 1986 4.16 
Botswana 1980 4.15 
Rwanda 2002 4.15 
Togo 1978 4.15 
Eritrea 2003 4.15 
Congo Rep. 1984 4.14 
Ghana 1985 4.13 
Botswana 1981 4.12 
Chad 2002 4.11 
Congo Rep. 1985 4.11 
Rwanda 1976 4.11 
Botswana 1982 4.09 
Congo Rep. 1986 4.08 
Lesotho 1987 4.06 
Botswana 1983 4.06 
Ghana 1986 4.06 
Kenya 1986 4.06 
Congo Rep. 1987 4.05 
Rwanda 1975 4.03 
Lesotho 1996 4.03 
Botswana 1984 4.03 
Congo Rep. 1988 4.02 
China 1981 4.01 
Chad 2001 4.01 
Zambia 1996 4.00 
Botswana 1985 4.00 
Congo Rep. 1989 3.99 
Ghana 1987 3.99 
Rwanda 2003 3.99 
Lesotho 1988 3.97 
Guinea 1991 3.97 
Ethiopia 2006 3.97 
Congo Rep. 1990 3.96 
Congo Rep. 1973 3.95 
Congo Rep. 1991 3.93 
Ghana 1988 3.93 
Ethiopia 2005 3.92 
Country Year TerTilt 
Togo 1996 3.92 
Congo Rep. 1992 3.90 
Chad 2000 3.90 
Chad 2005 3.90 
Togo 1977 3.89 
Chad 2004 3.89 
Lesotho 1989 3.88 
Congo Rep. 1993 3.88 
Ethiopia 2004 3.87 
Lesotho 1997 3.86 
Ghana 1989 3.86 
China 1982 3.85 
Botswana 1986 3.85 
Congo Rep. 1994 3.85 
Swaziland 2000 3.84 
Belize 2003 3.84 
Rwanda 2004 3.83 
Ethiopia 2003 3.82 
Lesotho 2005 3.82 
Lesotho 2006 3.82 
Congo Rep. 1995 3.82 
Burundi 2002 3.81 
Kenya 1985 3.81 
Chad 1999 3.80 
Ghana 1990 3.79 
Swaziland 1999 3.79 
Swaziland 1993 3.79 
Congo Rep. 1996 3.79 
Zambia 1997 3.79 
Lesotho 1990 3.79 
Swaziland 1992 3.78 
Swaziland 1991 3.78 
Ethiopia 2002 3.77 
Swaziland 1990 3.77 
Congo Rep. 1997 3.76 
Swaziland 1998 3.74 
Chad 1998 3.74 
Congo Rep. 1972 3.73 
Congo Rep. 1998 3.73 
Ethiopia 2001 3.73 
Ghana 1991 3.73 
Cent. Afr. 2006 3.71 
Country Year TerTilt 
Lesotho 2004 3.71 
Congo Rep. 1999 3.70 
Botswana 1987 3.70 
Lesotho 1998 3.69 
Lesotho 1991 3.69 
China 1983 3.69 
Bhutan 2000 3.69 
Ethiopia 2000 3.68 
Chad 1997 3.68 
Togo 1997 3.68 
Congo Rep. 2000 3.67 
Rwanda 2005 3.66 
Swaziland 1989 3.66 
Ghana 1992 3.66 
Congo Rep. 2001 3.64 
Ethiopia 1999 3.63 
Togo 1976 3.62 
Swaziland 1994 3.62 
Lesotho 1995 3.62 
Chad 1996 3.62 
Lesotho 1992 3.60 
Ghana 1993 3.59 
Lesotho 2003 3.59 
Ethiopia 1998 3.58 
Lesotho 1999 3.57 
Zambia 1998 3.57 
Togo 1999 3.55 
Swaziland 1988 3.55 
Botswana 1988 3.54 
Eritrea 2002 3.54 
Lesotho 1993 3.53 
Ethiopia 1997 3.53 
China 1984 3.53 
Ghana 1994 3.53 
Swaziland 1997 3.51 
Congo Rep. 1971 3.50 
Burundi 2003 3.49 
Ethiopia 1996 3.48 
Lesotho 2002 3.48 
The Gambia 2004 3.47 
Mozambique 2004 3.46 
Ghana 1995 3.46 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Swaziland 1995 3.45 
Swaziland 2001 3.45 
Swaziland 1987 3.44 
Swaziland 2003 3.44 
Congo Rep. 2002 3.44 
Togo 1998 3.43 
The Gambia 2003 3.43 
Ghana 1996 3.39 
Botswana 1989 3.39 
The Gambia 2002 3.38 
China 1985 3.37 
Lesotho 2001 3.36 
Togo 1975 3.36 
Eritrea 2001 3.36 
Vietnam 1994 3.35 
Zambia 1999 3.35 
Ethiopia 1995 3.34 
Swaziland 1986 3.34 
Lesotho 2000 3.33 
The Gambia 2001 3.33 
Guyana 1985 3.33 
Burkina Faso 1994 3.33 
Botswana 2005 3.33 
Ghana 1997 3.33 
Mali 1995 3.32 
Swaziland 2004 3.31 
Botswana 2004 3.31 
China 1986 3.31 
Botswana 2003 3.29 
The Gambia 2000 3.29 
Swaziland 1996 3.28 
Congo Rep. 1970 3.28 
Ethiopia 1985 3.28 
Botswana 2002 3.28 
Thailand 1970 3.27 
Ghana 1998 3.26 
Botswana 2001 3.26 
China 1987 3.25 
India 1970 3.24 
Botswana 2000 3.24 
Botswana 1990 3.24 
The Gambia 1999 3.24 
Country Year TerTilt 
Swaziland 1985 3.23 
Botswana 1999 3.22 
Guyana 1986 3.22 
India 1971 3.21 
Botswana 1998 3.21 
Lesotho 1994 3.20 
The Gambia 1998 3.19 
Ghana 1999 3.19 
Swaziland 2002 3.19 
Botswana 1997 3.19 
Burkina Faso 1995 3.19 
China 1988 3.19 
Ethiopia 1986 3.18 
India 1972 3.18 
Botswana 1996 3.17 
Mali 1996 3.16 
Botswana 1995 3.16 
Mauritania 1990 3.15 
The Gambia 1997 3.15 
India 1973 3.14 
Madagascar 2006 3.14 
Botswana 1994 3.14 
Zambia 2000 3.13 
Mauritania 1991 3.13 
Ghana 2000 3.13 
China 1989 3.12 
Botswana 1993 3.12 
Swaziland 2005 3.12 
India 1974 3.11 
Botswana 1992 3.11 
Guyana 1987 3.10 
Burundi 2004 3.10 
The Gambia 1996 3.10 
Togo 1974 3.10 
Togo 2000 3.09 
Zimbabwe 1993 3.09 
Botswana 1991 3.09 
Ethiopia 1987 3.08 
Lao PDR 1998 3.08 
Samoa 2001 3.08 
India 1975 3.08 
Madagascar 2001 3.08 
Country Year TerTilt 
China 1990 3.06 
Ghana 2001 3.06 
Mauritania 1992 3.06 
Thailand 1971 3.05 
The Gambia 1995 3.05 
Burkina Faso 1996 3.05 
Lao PDR 2001 3.05 
India 1976 3.05 
Benin 1995 3.05 
Ethiopia 1994 3.04 
Madagascar 2002 3.04 
Madagascar 2005 3.03 
Zimbabwe 1994 3.03 
Senegal 1998 3.02 
India 1977 3.01 
Vanuatu 2001 3.01 
The Gambia 1994 3.01 
Senegal 1997 3.00 
Madagascar 2003 3.00 
China 1991 3.00 
Ghana 2002 2.99 
Vietnam 1995 2.99 
Mali 1997 2.99 
Guyana 1988 2.99 
Senegal 1996 2.99 
Cape Verde 2002 2.99 
Mauritania 1993 2.99 
Ethiopia 1988 2.99 
Madagascar 1999 2.98 
India 1978 2.98 
Senegal 1995 2.97 
Zimbabwe 1995 2.97 
Madagascar 2004 2.97 
Senegal 1994 2.96 
Senegal 1999 2.95 
India 1979 2.95 
Senegal 1993 2.95 
China 1992 2.94 
Nepal 1998 2.93 
Senegal 1992 2.93 
Ghana 2003 2.93 
Senegal 1991 2.92 
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Country Year TerTilt 
India 1980 2.92 
Mauritania 1994 2.92 
Burkina Faso 1997 2.91 
Zimbabwe 1996 2.91 
Burundi 2005 2.90 
Senegal 1990 2.90 
Ethiopia 1989 2.89 
Senegal 1989 2.89 
Senegal 2000 2.88 
India 1981 2.88 
Guyana 1989 2.88 
Benin 1996 2.87 
Senegal 1988 2.87 
Lao PDR 2000 2.86 
Mauritius 1990 2.86 
Ghana 2004 2.86 
Senegal 1987 2.86 
Zimbabwe 1975 2.86 
India 1982 2.85 
Zimbabwe 1976 2.85 
Senegal 1986 2.84 
Mauritania 1995 2.84 
Zimbabwe 1997 2.84 
Zimbabwe 1977 2.84 
Belize 2004 2.84 
Thailand 1972 2.84 
Zimbabwe 1978 2.83 
Togo 1973 2.83 
Mauritius 1989 2.83 
Senegal 1985 2.83 
Zimbabwe 1979 2.83 
Mali 1998 2.82 
Samoa 2000 2.82 
Zimbabwe 1980 2.82 
India 1983 2.82 
Madagascar 2000 2.82 
Mauritius 1991 2.82 
Senegal 2001 2.82 
Uganda 2004 2.82 
Lao PDR 1999 2.82 
Mauritius 1988 2.80 
Ghana 2005 2.79 
Country Year TerTilt 
Ethiopia 1990 2.79 
India 1984 2.79 
Zimbabwe 1998 2.78 
Mauritius 1992 2.78 
Burkina Faso 1998 2.78 
Ethiopia 1991 2.77 
Mauritius 1987 2.77 
Guyana 1990 2.76 
Cambodia 1999 2.76 
Ethiopia 1992 2.76 
India 1985 2.75 
Senegal 2002 2.75 
Mauritius 1986 2.74 
Ethiopia 1993 2.74 
Mauritius 1993 2.74 
Zimbabwe 2000 2.72 
India 1986 2.72 
Zimbabwe 1999 2.72 
Cameroon 2006 2.71 
Mauritius 1985 2.71 
Trinidad & 1990 2.71 
Benin 1997 2.70 
Nepal 1997 2.70 
Mauritania 1996 2.70 
Venezuela 1990 2.70 
Mauritius 1994 2.69 
India 1987 2.69 
Senegal 2003 2.69 
Jamaica 1980 2.68 
Mauritius 1996 2.68 
Trinidad & 1991 2.67 
Nepal 1994 2.67 
China 1993 2.67 
Jamaica 1981 2.67 
Lao PDR 1997 2.66 
India 1988 2.66 
Jamaica 1982 2.65 
China 1999 2.65 
Guyana 1991 2.65 
Venezuela 1989 2.64 
Burkina Faso 1999 2.64 
Trinidad & 1992 2.63 
Country Year TerTilt 
Jamaica 1983 2.63 
Thailand 1973 2.63 
India 1989 2.62 
Venezuela 1991 2.62 
Senegal 2004 2.62 
Nepal 2000 2.62 
Jamaica 1984 2.61 
Kuwait 1970 2.60 
Trinidad & 1993 2.60 
Jamaica 1985 2.59 
Nepal 1993 2.59 
Venezuela 1988 2.59 
India 1990 2.59 
Benin 2000 2.58 
Jamaica 1986 2.58 
Tonga 2004 2.57 
Togo 1972 2.57 
Niger 2006 2.56 
Jamaica 1987 2.56 
India 1991 2.56 
Trinidad & 1994 2.56 
Mauritania 1997 2.56 
Senegal 2005 2.55 
Nepal 1999 2.55 
Venezuela 1992 2.54 
Jamaica 1988 2.54 
Cape Verde 2003 2.54 
Iran 1991 2.54 
Zimbabwe 1981 2.54 
Venezuela 1987 2.54 
Benin 1998 2.53 
Guyana 1992 2.53 
India 1992 2.53 
Jamaica 1989 2.52 
China 1995 2.52 
Trinidad & 1995 2.52 
Venezuela 1980 2.52 
Trinidad & 1999 2.51 
Nepal 1995 2.51 
Paraguay 1990 2.51 
Jamaica 1990 2.51 
Burkina Faso 2000 2.50 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Myanmar 1999 2.50 
Venezuela 1981 2.50 
Iran 1992 2.50 
Paraguay 1989 2.50 
Iran 1990 2.49 
India 1993 2.49 
Paraguay 1988 2.48 
Venezuela 1986 2.48 
Venezuela 1982 2.48 
Trinidad & 1996 2.48 
Nepal 1996 2.47 
Vietnam 1996 2.47 
Paraguay 1987 2.47 
Venezuela 1993 2.46 
Venezuela 1983 2.46 
Kenya 2004 2.46 
Zimbabwe 1992 2.46 
India 1994 2.46 
Benin 1999 2.46 
Paraguay 1986 2.46 
Chile 1980 2.46 
Iran 1989 2.45 
Guatemala 1992 2.45 
Paraguay 1985 2.45 
Venezuela 1984 2.45 
Trinidad & 1997 2.44 
Guatemala 1991 2.43 
Venezuela 1985 2.43 
India 1995 2.43 
Kenya 2003 2.43 
Mauritius 1997 2.42 
China 1994 2.42 
Guyana 1993 2.42 
Thailand 1974 2.41 
Guatemala 1990 2.41 
Mauritania 1998 2.41 
Benin 2004 2.41 
Jamaica 1991 2.41 
Trinidad & 1998 2.40 
Iran 1993 2.40 
Iran 1988 2.40 
Kuwait 1971 2.40 
Country Year TerTilt 
Vanuatu 2000 2.40 
Benin 2001 2.40 
India 1996 2.40 
Guatemala 1989 2.39 
Kenya 2002 2.39 
Venezuela 1994 2.39 
Zimbabwe 1991 2.38 
Cote d'Ivoire 1998 2.38 
Guatemala 1988 2.38 
Cameroon 2005 2.38 
Burkina Faso 2001 2.36 
Guatemala 1987 2.36 
Iran 1987 2.36 
Kenya 2001 2.35 
Paraguay 1991 2.35 
Benin 2003 2.35 
Myanmar 1998 2.34 
Lao PDR 2002 2.34 
Guatemala 1986 2.34 
Mauritius 1995 2.34 
Lao PDR 1992 2.34 
Guatemala 1985 2.32 
Comoros 1998 2.32 
China 1996 2.31 
Iran 1986 2.31 
Venezuela 1995 2.31 
Cambodia 2000 2.31 
Jamaica 1992 2.30 
Guyana 1994 2.30 
Togo 1971 2.30 
Guatemala 1984 2.30 
China 1997 2.30 
China 1998 2.29 
Guatemala 1983 2.28 
Benin 2002 2.28 
Zimbabwe 1990 2.28 
Mauritania 1999 2.27 
Armenia 2001 2.27 
Guatemala 1982 2.27 
Morocco 1975 2.26 
Iran 1985 2.26 
Zimbabwe 1982 2.26 
Country Year TerTilt 
India 1997 2.25 
Chile 1981 2.25 
Guatemala 1981 2.25 
Lao PDR 1996 2.24 
Morocco 1976 2.24 
Venezuela 1996 2.23 
Guatemala 1980 2.23 
Burkina Faso 2002 2.22 
Kenya 2000 2.22 
Lao PDR 1993 2.21 
Guatemala 1979 2.21 
Morocco 1977 2.21 
Gabon 1998 2.21 
Jamaica 1993 2.20 
Kuwait 1972 2.20 
Thailand 1975 2.20 
Guatemala 1978 2.19 
Guyana 1995 2.19 
Paraguay 1992 2.19 
Myanmar 1997 2.18 
Morocco 1978 2.18 
Guatemala 1977 2.17 
Mauritius 1998 2.17 
Qatar 1975 2.16 
Kuwait 2006 2.16 
Guatemala 1976 2.16 
Kuwait 2005 2.16 
Morocco 1979 2.15 
Venezuela 1997 2.15 
Cyprus 1975 2.15 
Thailand 1976 2.14 
Guatemala 1975 2.14 
Morocco 1980 2.13 
Mauritania 2000 2.12 
Cameroon 1998 2.12 
Paraguay 1996 2.12 
Guatemala 1974 2.12 
Colombia 1980 2.12 
India 1998 2.11 
Trinidad & 2000 2.11 
Zimbabwe 1989 2.10 
Jamaica 1994 2.10 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Guatemala 1973 2.10 
Morocco 1981 2.10 
Paraguay 1995 2.09 
Thailand 1977 2.09 
Burkina Faso 2003 2.09 
Lao PDR 1994 2.09 
Mexico 1985 2.08 
Cameroon 1999 2.08 
Guatemala 1972 2.08 
Malaysia 1993 2.08 
Guyana 1996 2.07 
Venezuela 1998 2.07 
Kuwait 2004 2.07 
Morocco 1982 2.07 
Guatemala 1971 2.06 
Colombia 1981 2.06 
Kuwait 2003 2.06 
Paraguay 1994 2.06 
Kuwait 1991 2.05 
Mexico 1986 2.05 
Guatemala 1970 2.05 
Chile 1982 2.05 
Morocco 1983 2.04 
Cameroon 2000 2.04 
Togo 1970 2.04 
Malaysia 1999 2.04 
Thailand 1978 2.03 
Burkina Faso 2006 2.03 
Mexico 1984 2.03 
Myanmar 1996 2.03 
Paraguay 1993 2.03 
Nepal 2001 2.02 
Mexico 1987 2.02 
Guatemala 1993 2.02 
Morocco 1984 2.02 
Kuwait 1973 2.01 
Cameroon 2001 2.00 
Jamaica 1995 2.00 
Colombia 1982 2.00 
Venezuela 1999 2.00 
Malaysia 1998 1.99 
Morocco 1985 1.99 
Country Year TerTilt 
Mexico 1988 1.98 
Macao, China 2000 1.98 
Mauritania 2001 1.98 
Thailand 1979 1.98 
India 1999 1.97 
Zimbabwe 1983 1.97 
Kuwait 2002 1.97 
Mexico 1983 1.97 
Cameroon 2002 1.96 
Morocco 1986 1.96 
Namibia 1998 1.96 
Guyana 1997 1.96 
Lao PDR 1995 1.96 
Paraguay 1997 1.96 
Malaysia 1997 1.95 
Mexico 1989 1.95 
Burkina Faso 2004 1.95 
Cyprus 1976 1.94 
Colombia 1983 1.94 
Kuwait 1992 1.94 
Morocco 1987 1.93 
Zimbabwe 1988 1.93 
Malaysia 1994 1.93 
Cameroon 2003 1.92 
Mauritius 1999 1.92 
Malaysia 1992 1.92 
Thailand 1980 1.92 
Venezuela 2000 1.92 
Mexico 1990 1.92 
Kuwait 2001 1.91 
Cape Verde 2004 1.91 
Mexico 1982 1.91 
Malaysia 1996 1.91 
Morocco 1988 1.91 
Malaysia 2001 1.90 
Lao PDR 2003 1.90 
Jamaica 1996 1.90 
India 2005 1.89 
India 2004 1.89 
Cameroon 2004 1.89 
Nepal 2002 1.88 
Morocco 1989 1.88 
Country Year TerTilt 
Colombia 1984 1.88 
Malaysia 2000 1.87 
Bangladesh 2005 1.87 
Myanmar 1995 1.87 
Malaysia 1995 1.87 
Kuwait 1990 1.87 
Kuwait 2000 1.86 
Namibia 2006 1.86 
Mexico 1981 1.85 
Cambodia 2001 1.85 
Morocco 1990 1.85 
Guyana 1998 1.85 
Venezuela 2001 1.84 
Chile 1983 1.84 
Namibia 1999 1.83 
Mauritania 2002 1.83 
India 2000 1.83 
India 2001 1.83 
Mexico 1991 1.83 
India 2002 1.83 
Morocco 1991 1.82 
India 2003 1.82 
Morocco 2000 1.82 
Kuwait 1993 1.82 
Thailand 1981 1.82 
Colombia 1985 1.82 
Bangladesh 2004 1.81 
Bangladesh 1998 1.81 
Burkina Faso 2005 1.81 
Kuwait 1974 1.81 
Kuwait 1999 1.81 
Jamaica 1997 1.80 
Cuba 1996 1.80 
Morocco 1992 1.80 
Mexico 1980 1.80 
Namibia 2005 1.79 
Paraguay 1998 1.79 
Costa Rica 1991 1.77 
Morocco 1993 1.77 
Venezuela 2002 1.76 
Brazil 1999 1.76 
Colombia 1986 1.76 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Zimbabwe 1987 1.76 
Kuwait 1998 1.75 
Nepal 2003 1.75 
Mexico 1992 1.74 
Morocco 1994 1.74 
Cyprus 1977 1.74 
Cuba 1995 1.73 
Guyana 1999 1.73 
Namibia 2004 1.73 
Morocco 2001 1.73 
Morocco 1999 1.73 
Thailand 1982 1.72 
Trinidad & 2001 1.71 
Tunisia 1999 1.71 
Morocco 1995 1.71 
Myanmar 1994 1.71 
Namibia 2000 1.71 
Kuwait 1994 1.71 
Kuwait 1997 1.70 
Jamaica 1998 1.70 
Colombia 1987 1.70 
Zimbabwe 1984 1.69 
Mauritius 2002 1.69 
Mauritania 2003 1.69 
Morocco 1996 1.69 
Venezuela 2003 1.68 
Kuwait 1989 1.68 
Macao, China 2001 1.68 
Guatemala 1994 1.67 
Mauritius 2000 1.67 
El Salvador 1998 1.67 
Namibia 2003 1.67 
Bangladesh 2000 1.66 
Bangladesh 1999 1.66 
Jamaica 2001 1.66 
Morocco 1997 1.66 
U.A.E. 2000 1.66 
Morocco 2002 1.65 
Brazil 2000 1.65 
Bangladesh 2001 1.65 
Kuwait 1996 1.64 
Colombia 1988 1.64 
Country Year TerTilt 
Costa Rica 1992 1.64 
Guatemala 1995 1.63 
Chile 1984 1.63 
Morocco 1998 1.63 
Tunisia 2000 1.63 
Paraguay 1999 1.63 
Jamaica 2000 1.63 
Bangladesh 2002 1.63 
Malaysia 2002 1.63 
Thailand 1983 1.62 
Guyana 2000 1.62 
Malaysia 2003 1.62 
Kuwait 1975 1.61 
Guatemala 1996 1.61 
Venezuela 2004 1.61 
Cuba 1997 1.60 
Jamaica 1999 1.60 
Kuwait 1995 1.59 
Bolivia 1996 1.59 
Malaysia 2004 1.59 
Namibia 2001 1.58 
Zimbabwe 1986 1.58 
Guatemala 1997 1.58 
Iran 1994 1.58 
Colombia 1989 1.58 
Cuba 1994 1.57 
Costa Rica 1993 1.57 
Morocco 2003 1.57 
Ukraine 2000 1.56 
Guatemala 1998 1.55 
Mexico 1993 1.55 
Albania 2002 1.55 
Mauritania 2004 1.55 
Mexico 1994 1.55 
Kuwait 1976 1.54 
Malta 2001 1.54 
Mexico 1995 1.54 
Mexico 1996 1.53 
Cyprus 1978 1.53 
Hong Kong 2003 1.53 
Venezuela 2005 1.53 
Thailand 1984 1.53 
Country Year TerTilt 
Guatemala 1999 1.53 
Mexico 1997 1.52 
Israel 1980 1.52 
Mexico 1998 1.52 
Colombia 1990 1.52 
Brazil 2001 1.51 
Brazil 2002 1.51 
Costa Rica 1994 1.51 
Morocco 2004 1.51 
Guyana 2001 1.50 
U.A.E. 2001 1.50 
Guatemala 2000 1.50 
Hong Kong 2004 1.50 
Kuwait 1988 1.49 
Jamaica 2002 1.49 
Tunisia 2001 1.48 
Dominican 1985 1.48 
Kuwait 1977 1.47 
Guatemala 2001 1.47 
Paraguay 2000 1.47 
Lao PDR 2004 1.46 
Namibia 2002 1.46 
Colombia 1991 1.46 
Israel 1981 1.46 
South Africa 1998 1.45 
Venezuela 2006 1.45 
Costa Rica 1995 1.44 
Ukraine 2001 1.44 
Guatemala 2002 1.44 
Thailand 1985 1.43 
Chile 1985 1.43 
Mauritius 2001 1.42 
Hong Kong 2006 1.42 
Bolivia 1997 1.42 
South Africa 1999 1.42 
Guatemala 2003 1.42 
U.A.E. 2002 1.41 
Zimbabwe 1985 1.41 
Cape Verde 2006 1.41 
Cuba 1998 1.41 
Hong Kong 2005 1.41 
Kuwait 1978 1.41 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Tunisia 2002 1.40 
Morocco 2005 1.40 
Mauritania 2005 1.40 
Colombia 1992 1.40 
Chile 1986 1.39 
Bangladesh 2003 1.39 
Israel 1982 1.39 
Guyana 2002 1.39 
Guatemala 2004 1.39 
Costa Rica 1996 1.38 
South Africa 2000 1.38 
Macao, China 2002 1.38 
Guatemala 2005 1.36 
Chile 1987 1.36 
Papua N. 1998 1.36 
Mexico 1999 1.35 
Romania 2001 1.35 
Cyprus 2000 1.34 
Bolivia 2000 1.34 
Iran 2001 1.34 
Kuwait 1979 1.34 
Colombia 1993 1.34 
Guatemala 2006 1.33 
South Africa 2001 1.33 
Thailand 1986 1.33 
Cyprus 1979 1.33 
Chile 1988 1.33 
Israel 1983 1.32 
South Africa 2003 1.32 
Bolivia 2001 1.32 
Costa Rica 2000 1.32 
South Africa 2002 1.32 
Costa Rica 1997 1.32 
Mauritius 2003 1.31 
Malta 2002 1.31 
Ukraine 2002 1.30 
Kuwait 1987 1.30 
Cape Verde 2005 1.30 
Tunisia 2004 1.30 
Chile 1989 1.29 
U.A.E. 2003 1.29 
Paraguay 2001 1.29 
Country Year TerTilt 
Fiji 2004 1.28 
Colombia 1994 1.28 
Guyana 2003 1.27 
Kuwait 1980 1.27 
Macedonia, 1994 1.26 
Chile 1990 1.26 
Israel 1984 1.26 
South Africa 2005 1.25 
Costa Rica 1998 1.25 
Bolivia 1998 1.25 
Mexico 2002 1.24 
South Africa 2004 1.23 
Thailand 1987 1.23 
Iran 2002 1.23 
Chile 1991 1.23 
Mauritius 2004 1.23 
Peru 1996 1.22 
Oman 1996 1.22 
Brazil 2003 1.22 
Tajikistan 2002 1.22 
Tunisia 2003 1.22 
Colombia 1995 1.22 
Cuba 1999 1.21 
Cuba 2000 1.21 
Kuwait 1981 1.20 
Israel 1985 1.19 
Ukraine 1999 1.19 
Costa Rica 1999 1.19 
Romania 2000 1.17 
Mexico 2000 1.16 
Guyana 2004 1.16 
Colombia 1996 1.15 
Peru 1997 1.15 
Kyrgyz Rep. 2000 1.15 
Israel 1986 1.14 
Marshall 2002 1.14 
El Salvador 1997 1.14 
Costa Rica 2002 1.14 
Panama 2002 1.14 
Mauritius 2005 1.14 
Costa Rica 2001 1.14 
Thailand 1988 1.13 
Country Year TerTilt 
Cuba 2001 1.13 
Kuwait 1982 1.13 
Oman 1997 1.12 
Thailand 1998 1.12 
Cyprus 1980 1.12 
Kuwait 1986 1.11 
Uruguay 1980 1.11 
Peru 2001 1.11 
Barbados 2001 1.10 
Andorra 2006 1.10 
Uruguay 1981 1.10 
Barbados 2000 1.10 
Peru 2000 1.10 
Uruguay 2003 1.10 
Israel 1987 1.10 
Colombia 1997 1.09 
Uruguay 1982 1.09 
Peru 1999 1.09 
Uruguay 1983 1.09 
Peru 1998 1.08 
Panama 1999 1.08 
Bulgaria 1980 1.08 
Uruguay 1984 1.08 
Panama 2003 1.08 
Bolivia 1999 1.07 
Peru 1995 1.07 
Uruguay 1985 1.07 
Cyprus 1999 1.06 
Ukraine 2003 1.06 
Mauritius 2006 1.06 
Kuwait 1983 1.06 
Iran 2003 1.06 
Uruguay 1986 1.06 
Jamaica 2003 1.06 
Iran 2000 1.06 
Uruguay 1987 1.05 
Bulgaria 1981 1.05 
Chile 1992 1.05 
Mexico 2003 1.05 
Israel 1988 1.05 
Bolivia 2002 1.05 
Uruguay 1988 1.04 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Uruguay 1989 1.04 
Thailand 1989 1.04 
Cyprus 1981 1.03 
Colombia 1998 1.03 
Cyprus 1998 1.03 
Uruguay 1990 1.03 
Oman 1998 1.02 
Bulgaria 1982 1.02 
Uruguay 1991 1.02 
Lao PDR 2005 1.02 
Mexico 2004 1.02 
Malta 2003 1.02 
Chile 1993 1.01 
Mexico 2005 1.01 
Kyrgyz Rep. 2002 1.01 
Uruguay 1992 1.01 
Panama 2004 1.01 
Panama 2001 1.01 
Uruguay 1993 1.00 
Israel 1989 1.00 
Kuwait 1984 1.00 
Uruguay 1994 0.99 
Bulgaria 1983 0.99 
Aruba 2001 0.99 
Romania 1999 0.99 
Ukraine 2004 0.99 
Uruguay 1995 0.99 
Tunisia 2005 0.98 
Romania 2002 0.98 
Uruguay 1996 0.98 
Uruguay 2004 0.97 
Colombia 1999 0.97 
Mexico 2001 0.97 
Macao, China 2003 0.97 
Cuba 2002 0.97 
Uruguay 1997 0.97 
Bulgaria 1984 0.97 
Cyprus 2003 0.96 
Uruguay 1998 0.96 
Uruguay 1999 0.95 
Israel 1990 0.95 
Cyprus 1982 0.95 
Country Year TerTilt 
Costa Rica 2003 0.95 
Thailand 1997 0.94 
Thailand 1990 0.94 
Bulgaria 1985 0.94 
Brazil 2004 0.94 
Kuwait 1985 0.93 
Aruba 2002 0.93 
Oman 1999 0.92 
Iran 2004 0.92 
Peru 1994 0.92 
Colombia 2000 0.91 
Thailand 1999 0.91 
Aruba 2003 0.91 
Chile 1994 0.91 
Israel 1991 0.90 
Kyrgyz Rep. 2001 0.90 
Aruba 2004 0.90 
Uruguay 2002 0.88 
Paraguay 2003 0.87 
Cuba 2003 0.87 
Israel 1992 0.86 
Cyprus 1983 0.86 
Iran 2005 0.86 
El Salvador 1999 0.85 
Colombia 2001 0.85 
Uruguay 2000 0.84 
Slovenia 1992 0.84 
Thailand 1991 0.84 
Ukraine 2005 0.83 
Paraguay 2002 0.83 
Slovenia 1994 0.83 
Oman 2000 0.82 
Jordan 1999 0.82 
Panama 2000 0.82 
Bulgaria 1986 0.82 
Romania 1998 0.81 
Ukraine 1998 0.81 
Cyprus 1997 0.81 
Romania 2004 0.80 
Cyprus 2002 0.80 
Bolivia 2003 0.80 
Romania 2005 0.79 
Country Year TerTilt 
Slovenia 1991 0.79 
Lebanon 2005 0.79 
Peru 2002 0.79 
Aruba 2000 0.79 
Iran 2006 0.79 
Cyprus 2001 0.79 
Andorra 2004 0.78 
Guyana 2005 0.78 
Cyprus 1984 0.77 
Iran 1999 0.77 
Peru 1993 0.77 
Thailand 1996 0.76 
Uruguay 2005 0.76 
Paraguay 2004 0.76 
Uruguay 2006 0.75 
Iran 1995 0.75 
Costa Rica 2004 0.75 
Chile 1995 0.75 
Uruguay 2001 0.74 
Thailand 1992 0.74 
Aruba 2005 0.74 
Azerbaijan 2000 0.73 
Israel 1993 0.72 
Oman 2001 0.72 
Malta 2004 0.72 
Oman 1995 0.71 
Thailand 2000 0.70 
Belarus 2006 0.70 
Belarus 2004 0.70 
Bulgaria 1987 0.70 
Belarus 2005 0.69 
Cyprus 1985 0.69 
Ukraine 2006 0.68 
Thailand 2001 0.66 
Slovenia 1993 0.66 
Andorra 2005 0.65 
Tajikistan 2003 0.65 
Azerbaijan 2001 0.65 
Thailand 1995 0.65 
Romania 2003 0.65 
Argentina 1998 0.64 
Thailand 1993 0.64 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Chile 1996 0.64 
Romania 1997 0.63 
Oman 2002 0.62 
El Salvador 2005 0.62 
El Salvador 1996 0.61 
Peru 1992 0.61 
Peru 2003 0.61 
Chile 1997 0.61 
Slovenia 1995 0.61 
Thailand 2002 0.61 
Palau 2001 0.60 
Cyprus 1996 0.59 
Israel 1994 0.59 
Cyprus 1992 0.59 
Chile 1998 0.58 
Azerbaijan 2002 0.58 
Bulgaria 1988 0.58 
Cyprus 1986 0.56 
Colombia 2002 0.56 
Thailand 2003 0.55 
Thailand 1994 0.54 
Estonia 1998 0.54 
Peru 2004 0.54 
Israel 1995 0.54 
Azerbaijan 2006 0.54 
Belarus 2003 0.52 
Slovenia 1996 0.52 
Azerbaijan 2003 0.52 
Croatia 2002 0.51 
El Salvador 2006 0.51 
Azerbaijan 2004 0.50 
Philippines 1995 0.49 
Thailand 2004 0.49 
Philippines 1996 0.49 
Oman 2003 0.49 
Azerbaijan 2005 0.49 
Iran 1998 0.49 
Philippines 1997 0.49 
Philippines 1998 0.49 
Israel 1996 0.49 
Tajikistan 2005 0.48 
Mongolia 2004 0.47 
Country Year TerTilt 
Peru 1991 0.46 
Bulgaria 1989 0.46 
Chile 1999 0.46 
Romania 1996 0.46 
Cuba 2004 0.45 
Romania 1992 0.45 
Croatia 2003 0.44 
Cyprus 1987 0.44 
Romania 1995 0.44 
Israel 1997 0.44 
Ukraine 1997 0.43 
Slovenia 1997 0.43 
Cyprus 1993 0.43 
Romania 1994 0.42 
Colombia 2003 0.41 
Peru 2006 0.41 
Bulgaria 2004 0.41 
Israel 2000 0.40 
Romania 1993 0.40 
Bulgaria 2003 0.40 
Israel 1999 0.40 
Cyprus 2004 0.40 
Cyprus 1994 0.39 
El Salvador 2004 0.39 
Romania 1991 0.39 
Israel 1998 0.38 
Latvia 1998 0.38 
Colombia 2006 0.38 
Cyprus 1995 0.37 
Argentina 2000 0.36 
Oman 2004 0.36 
Lithuania 2003 0.36 
Argentina 1999 0.35 
Belarus 2002 0.35 
Bulgaria 1990 0.34 
Slovenia 1998 0.34 
Philippines 1999 0.33 
Bulgaria 1991 0.33 
Romania 1990 0.33 
Croatia 2004 0.33 
Cuba 2005 0.32 
Cyprus 1988 0.31 
Country Year TerTilt 
Peru 1990 0.31 
Peru 2005 0.30 
Israel 2001 0.30 
Estonia 2001 0.30 
Estonia 2000 0.30 
Estonia 1999 0.30 
Philippines 2004 0.30 
Chile 2000 0.30 
Philippines 2005 0.29 
Lithuania 2004 0.29 
Israel 2003 0.27 
Tajikistan 2004 0.27 
Philippines 2002 0.27 
Colombia 2004 0.26 
Latvia 1999 0.26 
Mongolia 2003 0.25 
Slovenia 1999 0.24 
Colombia 2005 0.23 
Estonia 2002 0.23 
Croatia 2005 0.21 
Iran 1997 0.21 
Chile 2001 0.21 
Lithuania 2002 0.20 
Bulgaria 1993 0.19 
Chile 2004 0.19 
Cyprus 1989 0.19 
Philippines 2003 0.18 
Cyprus 1991 0.18 
Philippines 2000 0.18 
Argentina 2002 0.18 
Belarus 2001 0.17 
Philippines 2001 0.17 
El Salvador 2003 0.16 
Croatia 2006 0.16 
Peru 1989 0.15 
Slovenia 2000 0.15 
Israel 2002 0.15 
Bulgaria 2002 0.15 
Bulgaria 2001 0.15 
Argentina 2001 0.14 
Estonia 2003 0.14 
Latvia 2000 0.14 
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Country Year TerTilt 
Israel 2004 0.14 
Bulgaria 1992 0.13 
Lithuania 2005 0.13 
Chile 2002 0.12 
El Salvador 1995 0.09 
Bulgaria 2000 0.08 
El Salvador 2002 0.07 
Cyprus 1990 0.07 
Slovenia 2001 0.06 
Peru 1970 0.06 
Ukraine 1996 0.06 
Chile 2006 0.06 
El Salvador 2001 0.05 
Lithuania 2001 0.05 
Bulgaria 1994 0.04 
Mongolia 2002 0.04 
Argentina 2004 0.04 
El Salvador 2000 0.04 
Ukraine 1991 0.02 
Cuba 2006 0.02 
Bulgaria 1999 0.02 
Bulgaria 2005 0.01 
Azerbaijan 1999 0.01 
Peru 1988 0.00 
Chile 2003 0.00 
Slovenia 2004 0.00 
Latvia 2001 -0.01 
Belarus 2000 -0.01 
Peru 1971 -0.03 
Chile 2005 -0.03 
Bulgaria 1998 -0.05 
Argentina 2003 -0.05 
Estonia 2004 -0.05 
Kazakhstan 2002 -0.05 
Iran 1996 -0.08 
Country Year TerTilt 
Oman 2005 -0.08 
Slovenia 2002 -0.09 
Slovenia 2005 -0.10 
Lithuania 2000 -0.11 
Peru 1972 -0.12 
Slovenia 2003 -0.13 
Peru 1987 -0.15 
Latvia 2002 -0.16 
Belarus 1999 -0.19 
Peru 1973 -0.21 
South Korea 1985 -0.25 
Lithuania 1999 -0.26 
Kazakhstan 2003 -0.27 
Azerbaijan 1995 -0.29 
Peru 1974 -0.29 
Peru 1986 -0.31 
Bulgaria 1997 -0.31 
Ukraine 1995 -0.32 
South Korea 1986 -0.35 
Latvia 2003 -0.35 
Belarus 1998 -0.36 
Belarus 1991 -0.37 
Peru 1980 -0.37 
Peru 1979 -0.38 
Peru 1978 -0.38 
Peru 1977 -0.38 
Peru 1976 -0.38 
Peru 1975 -0.38 
Peru 1981 -0.39 
Peru 1982 -0.41 
Lithuania 1998 -0.42 
Peru 1983 -0.42 
Azerbaijan 1996 -0.43 
South Korea 1987 -0.44 
Peru 1984 -0.44 
Country Year TerTilt 
Peru 1985 -0.46 
Kazakhstan 2004 -0.48 
Latvia 2004 -0.51 
Ukraine 1992 -0.52 
South Korea 1988 -0.54 
Belarus 1997 -0.54 
Kazakhstan 2005 -0.56 
Bulgaria 1996 -0.57 
Azerbaijan 1997 -0.57 
South Korea 1989 -0.63 
Bulgaria 1995 -0.67 
South Korea 2003 -0.69 
Ukraine 1994 -0.70 
Belarus 1996 -0.72 
Azerbaijan 1998 -0.72 
South Korea 1990 -0.73 
South Korea 2004 -0.76 
Belarus 1992 -0.79 
South Korea 1991 -0.81 
South Korea 1993 -0.88 
Belarus 1993 -0.89 
Belarus 1995 -0.89 
South Korea 1992 -0.94 
South Korea 1994 -1.04 
Belarus 1994 -1.05 
Ukraine 1993 -1.07 
South Korea 1995 -1.15 
South Korea 1996 -1.15 
South Korea 1997 -1.16 
South Korea 1998 -1.16 
South Korea 1999 -1.17 
South Korea 2000 -1.17 
South Korea 2001 -1.18 
South Korea 2002 -1.18 
 
